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ABSTRACT 
The Manila Treaty of 1954 was a unique event in the 
history of Southeast Asia. It provided for the creation 
of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Organization, the 
first joint alliance between Western powers and the newly 
independent nations of this regiono These nations were the 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and France. The 
problem was first to determine the reasons for the creation 
of such an alliance. There had been no plans for collective 
action since the dissolution of the old imperial defense 
systems following World War II. With the removal of colonial 
administrations during the early postwar period, a "power 
vacuum" resulted which found millions of Asians in small, 
unstable states having little means of self defense and 
unprepared to act collectively against massive threats to 
their integrity. The rise of a militant Communist China in 
the north prompted active concern for the security of these 
small nations. The Western powers themselves were anxious 
to retain the old prewar Open Door doctrines in this area 
and took steps to join with the nations of Southeast Asia in 
this comm0n interest. The defeat of the French at Dien Bien 
Phu by the Communist Viet•minh created an atmosphere of 
urgency a~d resulted in immediate agreement for a mutual col-
lective defense. The primary purpose of the resulting Manila 
iii 
Treaty was to protect the nations of Southeast Asia against 
possible Communist aggression or subversion and to stabilize 
the areas facing a hostile Communist China, particularly in 
the Indo-China region. This feature of the Treaty was 
expected to provide the states of Indo-China an additional 
guarantee of security against violation of the Geneva Agree-
ment if they requested such protection. 
The next portion of the problem was to analyze the 
various positions taken against this means of collective 
security by the individual states which declined to join the 
compact. A review of the political and nationalist re-
actions of the neutral and Communist countries most closely 
concerned has helped to determine the source and nature of 
the widespread hostility to the Treaty. Next it was 
necessary to analyze the Treaty provisions and the organiza-
tion, and then weigh SEATO•s effectiveness against the 
series of political and military crises that have occurred 
in the Treaty area since 1954. 
Location of the available materials used in this 
study constituted no problem, for most of the essential 
research had to be drawn from sources published by the 
governments involved. There has not been sufficient lapse 
of time for secret and private documents to have become 
available, so no final conclusions-•no definitive history--
can yet be written. 
iv 
The decade since the creation of the Southeast Asia 
Collective Defense Organization has witnessed some challenges 
to the peace and security of this Asian area, but none has 
been considered of sufficient magnitude to call for the 
concerted military reaction of the Treaty organizationo 
Although the insurgency now taking place in South Vietnam 
might be interpreted to be a potential threat to the Treaty 
region, SEATO has carefully avoided precipitous action and 
entanglement in this problem because of the internal 
political implications of the uprising. The organization's 
military domination by the Western powers has had some 
alienating effect on many Asians still sensitive to possible 
revival of colonialism in any form. Therefore, a broader 
base of Asian support and participation, with a corresponding 
dimunition of the Western role might strengthen the political 
effectiveness of the alliance. However, this study indicates 
that SEATO deserves credit for moderating, at least for a 
pe~iod, relations between rival states in the area, and 
continues to play an important role in the political stability 
of Southeast Asiao 
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I 
INTRODUC~ION 
Since the signing of the Manila Treaty in 1954 and 
the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization soon 
afterwards, sufficient time has passed to review with some 
confidence the events which led to the creation of this 
defense pact and its history. Hot onl1 could the passing 
of ten 1ears test the durability of such a treat1 1 but it 
could measure, as well, its versatilit1 in meeting the con-
stantly changing political challenges of this evolving 
Asian area. 
The primary purpose of the Manila Treaty was to 
strengthen the nations of Southeast Asia against possible 
aggression or internal subversion and to stabilize politi• 
call7 the areas facing a hostile Communist China, partieu-
laril7 in the Indo-China region. Aside from economic and 
political objectives, the main plll"pose of the Treaty was to 
provide collective military defense for the signatory powers 
and for certain designated states that might request military 
assistance in case ot attack. This feature of the Treaty was 
to provide the tree states of Indo-China, Laos, Cambodia, and di-
Vided Vietnam an additional guarantee against any violations 
ot the Geneva accord. All the signatory powers were com" 
mitted to defense plans which coula involve each 0£ them in 
2 
military action in event of ''aggression by means or armed 
attack in the Treaty area," or in the prevention or 
nsubversive activities directed from without against their 
territorial integrity and political stability." Obviously 
then, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEA.TO) is 
very I11Uch concerned with the continuing crises in South 
Vietnam and Laos, although neither situation has yet 
provoked the full concerted action of the Treaty powers. 
The Manila Treaty was not well received by some 
nations. The hostility of the Peoples Republic of China 
and the Soviet Union was expected, but the non-alignment 
and neutrality ot some ot the most vulnerable Southeast 
Asia states was a surprise and has not been easily under-
stood. The Treaty marked the culmination of a long series 
or political and military events which prompted some or 
the new, independent nations of this area to seek security 
through a pattern or collective defense. There had been no 
similar de~~n~e i stsuems established in the Treaty area since 
the dissolution of the old colonial systems of defense 
following World War II. The United States and other powers 
which had pre-war histories in these regions began talks 
during the Korean War which resulted in negotiation of the 
Manila Treaty in 1954. This joined Western and Eastern 
states in the mutual defense ot an Asian region. It was 
recognized by all the parties to the pact that the deten~e 
4 
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEA.TO) with 
headquarters at Bangkok, was created by the Treaty members 
to implement the provisions 0£ the Manila Treaty--economic. 
cultural. political, and military. This organization has 
grown considerably since its inception in 1955 and continues 
to play an important role in the policies 0£ the Treaty 
' 
nations, and in the Southeast Asian area in general. 
II 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A very important political development of the late 
nineteenth century was- the rapid domination and even the 
colonial partition of the Far East by European powers. The 
penetration of Southeast A.sia began as early as the sixteenth 
century and took various forms, depending on the intent and 
objectives of the colonial powers. The early Portuguese and 
Spanish settlements in Malaya and the Philippines placed 
strong emphasis on Christian conversions. The Dutch 
settlements in the Malacca straits and the Moluccas were 
prompted by commercial interests, while British and French 
colonial development, in addition to this econ.omic interest, 
attached great importance to political and strategic 
control of key areas as a source of power in an age of 
expanding national rivalries. 
This scramble for colonies in Asia reflected Europe's 
smoldering international competition for markets and 
materials and extended the European balance of power doc• 
trine to the Far East. The acquisition of the Philippines 
by the United States in 1898 as a result of the 
Spanish•American War added a new power element in the 
Pacific and at the same time enmeshed this country in the 
European scheme of power balance. Japan, however, was not 
immediately involved in this colonial pattern. But when 
6 
China challenged the independent status or Korea, the 
disastrous war with Japan which followed in 189~ gave 
Japanese ambitions in Manchuria and China an earl1 foothold. 
Baropean reaction to this development was swift and led to 
Russian seizure or Japanese•held Port Arthlll' and German 
occupation or Kiaoehow. '!'his colonial rivalry for the 
maritime provinces nearly reduced the defeated China to the 
role ot a spectator. Even American involvement in Asia 
f'ollowing the attachment or the Philippines was followed by. 
a casual disregard for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrit1 or China. Alarmed at the tendency toward ex• 
elusive partition and control of the China coast by Russia, 
Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, with a resultant threat 
to American trade, President McKin~ey stated to Congress in 
1898 that .America could not remain indifferent to events in 
China which passed control of large areas of that country 
to various European powers. He warned that the vast commerce 
created by American business interests could not be preju-
diced by an exclusive treatment b1 these colonial powers 
and this ''obviated the need for our country to become an 
actor in the seene."1 
'fhis earl1 demand for an open door for all commercial 
interests in the area became ~he foundation or .American 
. . ·
1A • . Wliitne1 Griswold,.!!!!~ Eastern Polic1 ,!! ~ 
Ynited States (New York: Harcourt, .Brace and tlompany, 1938), 
p. 5B2. 
7 
policf in China and led to deep American involvement in 
the intrigues and diplomatic maneuvers or the European 
powers in the Far East. The Open Door polic1 implied 
recognition of European spheres of in£luence in A.sia either 
bJ lease agreement, treaty, or mere occupation. Outside or 
the Philippines, United 'States policy was directed at pre• 
venting preclusive trade policies in these special spheres 
ot 1nr1uence. Nationalist reactions in China and South 
Asia to these predator1 moves by the West were quickly 
suppressed. In Southeast Asia the immediate objectives or 
resurgent nationalism were apolitical and were confined 
mainly to revitalizing all aspects of indigenous eultures. 2 
But the Boxer uprising in China took a more militant form 
and received the support or the Imperial Government or 
China. During this rebellion, Secretary or State John Hay 
declared that the United States• policy was to seek safety 
and peace in China, preserve Chinese territorial and 
administrative "entity'' and yet protect all the rights 
guaranteed to the ,friendly powers by treaty and international 
law.3 How this "entity" could be maintained with these 
special territorial privileges created questions of honest 
motive. The defeat of the Boxers was followed by the foreign 
, - - . . 
2Ri~~d Butwell, Southeast Asia Todaf and Tomorrow 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19'l>IT, . p. t>:--
3 ' 
Griswold, ~· ~., P• 86. 
8 
occupation of Peking and Manchuria and the imposition of 
heavy indemnities on the Imperial government. However, the 
uprising did serve to notify the Western powers that 
Chinese and Asian nationalism could assert itself and was a 
strong force to be reckoned with against any further en• 
croacbment on its territories. 
The advent of the Russo-Japanese War again returned 
Japanese rights in Manchuria to make her a leading colonial 
power on the Chinese mainland. Here again the concern of the 
United States for the preservation of the balance of power 
in Asia prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to intervene 
tor a peace settlement favorable to the Japanese. The 
previous Treaty of Alliance between Japan and England in 
1902 further countered France-Russian designs in the Far 
East. The Far Eastern p0licy of Roosevelt placed little 
emphasis on the coDmJ.ercial interests of the United States.4 
'!'he Treaty of Portsmouth offered no commercial advantages 
to the United States and confined American involvement to 
mere "good offices" in this dispute. In fact, the Roosevelt 
. . 
Policy did not admit any great concern for the economic 
interests of the United States in the political stabilization 
ot Manchuria and the assurance of a continued Open Door 
policy. But this was not so in the case of Japan in 
4Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and !:!!! Russo~Japanese 
War (Gloucester: Peter .Smith, .f9m, P• 4. .. 
9 
Manchuria where commercial interests quietly followed 
behind the Japanese armies.5 With Japanese "manifest 
destin1" in Korea and Manchuria already assured, it was 
onlJ a ~atter of time until Japanese hegemony over all of 
Borth China was to assert itself. The issue of the South 
Manchurian Railway was a serious impediment to the Open 
Door concept and the guarantee of full Chinese sovereignty 
in Manchuria. The Ta:t't administration attempted to curtail 
Japanese control of these vital commercial arteries by a 
policy of economic neutralization. With Japanese and 
Russian refusal to surrender their respective rights in 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Open Door 
adherents met a serious reversal. The remaining European 
powers vied for closer political control in Peking through 
the use of government and private loans to the Chinese 
government. American participation in such financial 
"influence peddling~ was quickly halted by the new Wilson 
administration with the President himself asserting that 
the conditions of such loans compromised the administrative 
independence of China.6 
Throughout the period of 1898 to 1914, American 
policies, more than those of any of the other powers, 
attempted to maintain equal opportunities for trade and 
investment in that vast market. A balance of power status 
5 6 ~., p. 311. ~., p. 172. 
10 
was established through both economic and political 
instruments of diplomacy and while these did not fully 
protect the so·vereignty of China, they did prevent the 
complete partition of China into cl0sed spheres of 
influence. The United States was an inhibiting influence 
against uncontrolled expansion and hegemony by Japan, 
Great Britain, Russia, and Germany in Asia through the 
Open Door policy. However, it is significant that this 
resulted not from formal policies and treaties sanctioned 
b1 the Congress of the United States, but rather by mere 
executive acts and agreements. 
The outbreak of World War I upset this balance of 
power in Asia. From then on, the so-called Open Door 
policy remained only a paper challenge to Japanese ambitions 
in China and the F'ar East in general. Immediate Japanese 
occupation of the former German leasehold territories and 
the German islands in the Pacific established for Japan, 
by right of conquest, a claim to legitimate presence in 
China and in the string of islands in the Pacific which 
cover the connnunication lanes between America and the 
Philippines. The imposition of the Twenty One Demands on 
the government . of China clearly announced Japan's future 
expansionist intentions in Asia. An important development 
following the United States• entry into the War was Japan's 
effort to win confirmation of her new German conquests prior 
Peace settlement in Europe and in this some success to a 
was achieved. The Lansing•lshii Agreement of 1917 oddly 
round the United States agreeing that "territorial 
11 
propinquity creates special relations between countries ••• ," 
giving Japan special interests in China, particularly in the 
part to which her possessions are contiguous.7 
The postwar developments in the Far East soon made 
evident to the Western powers that concessions made to the 
Japanese during the war created a pattern for £uture 
Japanese expansion. The Japanese eagerness to deploy 
troops into Siberia following the Russian Revolution in 
1918, coupled with Foreign Minister Ishii's insistence that 
Japan had special interests in Siberia, caused considerable 
concern in Washington regarding Japan's intentions and was 
a factor in the calling of the Washington Conference tor the 
Nine Power Treaty in 1922. The naval and diplomatic rivalry 
between Japan and the United States was somewhat eased by 
the Washington Conference. Naval limitations were estab-
lished, non-militarization of Pacific islands was agreed 
upon, removal of Japan .from the Shantung Peninsula was 
assured, the Open Door policy in China was reaffirmed, and 
the territorial integrity of China guaranteed. A series of 
resolutions opened the way for tariff cutting, and the future 
abolition of extraterritoriality was discussed. A second 
7Griswold, ~· ~., p. 216. 
12 
naval limitation agreement at the London Naval Conference 
was concluded in 1930. 8 The disarmament provisions of 
both these conferences weakened American strength in the 
Western Pacific.9 It was hoped that collective security 
in the form of the League of Nations would prevent any 
turther encroachment on Chinese territory or other 
territorial violations in the Far East. 
The Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 was not 
met by any effective collective action either inside or 
outside the League of Nations. The return of Japan again 
to an outmoded form of imperial conquest was in part the 
10 
result of external factors beyond her control. The 
conversion of Japan to an industrial nation created depend• 
ence on trade and access to raw materials. The depression 
of the early thirties brought about decisions to raise 
protective tariff policies throughout the world, causing 
Japan to face the specter of exclusion from the markets of 
11 the world. Manclmria, where Japan had long extensive 
interests, became a logical outlet for expansion. The 
strategic weakness of the United States policy during the 
( 8Edwin o. Reischauer, The United States and Japan New York: The Viking Press,T957), p. 23. - · . 
( 9John King Fairbank, The Unlted States and China New York: The Viking Press;-1:963), p. 9. -
10Rei~chauer, .Qll• .£!.!?.., p. 23. 
11Ibi"d 24 _., p. • 
13 
deeade which followed the Manchurian Incident invited 
.rurther Japanese diplomatic and military ventures in Asia 
which eventually led to Japanese and American involvement 
in World War II. Japanese militarism and duplicity, plus 
.&meriean insistence that Japan eonf'orm to the Open Door 
policy in China and give up the path of empire in China, 
12 led to this collision. 
Although the war in the Pacific was essentially a 
Japanese-American war, the states of Southeast Asia were 
quickly engulfed in the opening phases. British, Canadian, 
and Dutch units were caught in the Japanese sweep through 
Southeast Asia and the islands to the south. Burmese, 
Indian, Malayan, and Chinese troops participated against 
the Japanese in these early stages, but were soon over-
whelmed. American forces took the brunt of the military 
load in the Pacific and almost alone forced Japan and her 
. 13 
new wartime empire to destruction and surrender. The 
states of Southeast Asia were largely spectators to this 
drama though their destinies and political institutions 
were to be greatly affected by the war's outcome. 
Although the main Japanese effort was directed 
against the leading colonial powers in Asia-..Oreat Britain, 
12 .. 
Lloyd c. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal 
¥ftlomacz (Madison: The University of .Wisconsiii".15reBS; 
9 4J, p. 135. . 
l3Reischauer, .Q£• S,!!., p. 29. 
tbe Netherlands, and France~-it remained for the United 
States to conclude the peace for an area in which she bad 
no residual colonial or territorial interests since the 
independence of the Philippines had already been assured. 
Peace, then, presented new and myriad problems for the 
states of Southeast Asia. 
Tb.ere bad been no greater influence on these states, 
80 rar as their attitude toward the West was concerned, 
tban the long periods of colonial rule and development. 
Most of the imperial systems of economic organization, 
political structure, and philosophy of government were aimed 
at the perpetuation of colonial rule. Except in the British 
and American spheres, there was little thought given to 
education and training programs which might prepare the 
local populations for self rule. Native interest in partic-
ipation in government was deliberately confined to the 
lowest civil service levels and scales of advancement were 
circumscribed to these levels. In the field of public 
e~ucation this lack of opportunity was even more true and 
it usually became necessary for the ambitious student to go 
abroad to complete university degrees or acquire technical 
education. Indonesia and Indochina were striking examples 
ot this colonial failure to establish training in government 
administration.14 
York: 
14Jobn K. King, Southeast Asia .!.!! Perspectiv~ (New 
The Macmillan Company, 19~p • . 17. . 
15 
Except tor the United States and to a lesser extent 
Great Britain, none of the colonial powers promulgated plans 
with a view to future independence. Consequently, when 
independence finally came it did not take the form of an 
orderly transfer of power and authority, but stemmed mainly 
trom the confusion following the Japanese defeat in the 
Pacific. Long before the war, strong nationalist ambitions 
came to the surface to emphasize the revulsion of the people 
against foreign rule and domination. But most of the states 
were very poorly equipped indeed to cope with this new 
status of independence and when it became a reality some 
important political and economic functions of government 
vere neglected in order to cope with emergency challenges 
to law and order.15 
The concept of the political party as an instrument 
ot government was practically unknown and the sudden 
wide-spread proliferation of parties in these small countries 
led to chaotic situations. With no party discipline, follow-
ings were sometimes based largely on personal loyalties to 
friends rather than party doctrine, and quickly served 
ael.t'ish private ambitions which became a nuisance and 
hindrance to democratic procedures. The adjustment of border 
conflicts with neighbors consumed much of their international 
energies and little thought was given. at this time to the 
i5Ibid., p. 18. 
16 
aore complicated theories of regional alliances. Nor was 
serious thought given to t~ re-establishment of the 
ah&ttered prewar patterns of balance of power in regional 
groupings since militant Chinese Communism has not yet 
16 bee~ a reality or threat. 
During World War II the Japanese attempted to 
organize the conquered nations of Southeast A.sia into a 
regional sphere of economic and political development 
called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 17 A 
specific design of Japanese policy in this area was to 
break down the old traditional economic patterns of the 
colonial powers and re-awaken the national interests of the 
people. At the same time they would set themselves up as 
the protectors of this new philosophy. The opp0sition to 
colonialism was a common cause among these states and this 
made Japanese overtures most inviting. In many instances 
the Japanese occupation was originally greeted as a 
liberation and the prelude to real independence as soon as 
the war was over. Strong pro-Japanese elements were placed 
in positions of leadership and the populace was made to 
regard the Japanese as the helpful "brother. «18 The 
. .. 
16A. D~ak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: 
Ruper and Brothers, 1960), . p. 5. · - -
D 17Royal Institute ~f International Affairs, Collective 
etence .!!! South East Asia (London: The Chiswick Press, 1956), 
p. 29. ---- -----
18 King, £E.• ..Q.!!., P• 40. 
17 
Japanese pressed tbe economies of the occupied areas to the 
tullest and this soon aroused reactions in the form of 
protest and demonstrations which were brutally suppressed. 
!bi• quickly led to mass disenchantment throughout the 
occupied areas. But the philosophy of a Southeast Asia 
sphere of influence did much to nurture the growing 
nationalism of the area, and in this sense, the Japanese 
were quite successful. The plans drawn up by the Japanese 
Total War Research Institute for occupation policies, 
included the following directive: 
The desires of the peoples of the Sphere for 
their independence shall be respected and endeavors 
shall be made for their fulfillment, but proper and 
suitable forms of government shall be decided for 
them in consideration of military and economic 
requirements and of the historical, political, and 
cultural elements particular to each area. It must 
also be noted that the independence of the various 
peoples of East Asia sheuld be based on constructing 
East Asia as "independent countries existing within 
the New Order .of East Asia" and that this conception 
differs from independence based on the idea1Qt liberalism and national self determination. ~ 
This philosophy of "controlledfJ independence was in sharp 
. . 
contrast with the earlier hopes of these peoples and 
quickly negated hope for full cooperation by the occupied 
atates. Rather than gain support, the plan aroused rabid 
resistance and led to organized underground movements in 
support of the Allies. Thus the role of the Greater 
Co-Prosperity Sphere as a scheme for future development 
l9Ibid .. 26 
_., P• • 
18 
did not get beyond the blue print stage.20 
The immediate postwar period in Southeast Asia 
witnessed considerable confusion and patterns of political 
organization varied f'rom country to country. In many 
cases the vacuum left by the Japanese was filled by former 
colonial interests. Temporary "takeovers" of civil 
administration by local patriots were attempted in many 
instances, but seldom without inter-factional strife. And, 
in almost every case, except China, a reassertation of the 
tormer colonial power in the area was attempted and, in 
tact, succeeded for a limited period. The Dutch, after 
witnessing a short British military occupation, hastened 
to resecure their Netherlands East Indies. The French, 
after considerable political maneuver, were able to 
reestablish themselves in Indo-China. Likewise the 
British returned to Malaya and tor a short period to 
Burm.a, which had already been promised self rule. 
But these returns to the old prewar status quo did 
not reckon with the latent nationalism so recently fired 
by the Japanese. The movements for independence and 
self-government had indeed made strong headway during the 
war and it was not long before these became realities. 
Burma, the Netherlands East Indies, Indo..China, and the 
. 
20significantly, as late as 1950, the writer saw 
hanging in a Thai business office in Bangkok, a large 
Japanese wall . map of the planned co-prosperity sphere, 
complete with legends of raw material sources, :rrs.rkets, ete. 
19 
PJ:dlippines, under various degrees of difficulty, soon 
divested themselves of colonial control and found them• 
aelves facing the hard, harsh realities of self~government. 
!heJ were, in most cases, very poorly equipped for the 
21 task. 
Many of the problems immediately faced 'by these 
nations were the consequence of the long process of 
Westernization which of necessity they had to accept and 
vbich tended to compromise their oriental ways of living. 
Bxcept for Thailand, (and to some extent the Philippines), 
the legacy left by foreign administration created an 
atmosphere of constant suspicion of Western conduct and 
policy. Over long periods this foreign domination tended 
to disrupt the old traditional social structures. 22 Edu-
cation, family relationships, law, property rights, police 
relationships, and military administration were all altered 
to tit the pattern of Western interests. There was a 
consequent weakening of the moral base upon which the local 
societies had been founded. J. s. Fu.rnivall, in examining 
the effect of colonial rule in Southeast Asia, lists some 
ot the failures of the system as reflected in the deteriora• 
tion of societal forms: {l) failure of self•government 
21 King, .22• ~it., P• 27. 
( 
22J. s. Furnivall, Colonial Policz and Practice 
Cambridge: Calllbridge University P~ess, . 1948), P• 2lJi. 
20 
1Jlstitutions, (2~ increase in crime and litigation, (3) rise 
1D religious unrest, (4) increase in indebtedness and 
bUsiness failure, (5) tendency toward corruption in judicial 
~ 23 
and administrative branches or gover1lll1ent. 
Still fresh in the minds of most Southeast Asians 
va• their long and bitter struggle against colonial rule, 
and as a residual effect, there still existed a marked 
sensitivity to foreign influence and a suspicion of any 
aJT&ngements which implied active participation with stronger 
Western powers. Under these circumstances, any concepts of 
jointcontribution to collective security and participation 
in economic alliances with Western nations, had usually been 
moat suspect and very difficult to achieve. 
Whereas the new Southeastern Asian states were weak 
powers and had little concern in foreign a.t'fairs, Western 
interests in the area were vital. This applied to economic 
aa well as strategic interests. The tin, rubber, copra, 
and other raw materials found here had be~ome a part or the 
Veat•s economic life. The facilities for obtaining and 
protecting these essential raw materials ware likewise a 
part of the West's economic life. The Southeast Asia 
landmass stretches like a barrier across the strategic sea 
and air routes of East-West passage. The significance of 
23Ibid . 
_., p. ix. 
aoutheas t A.sia during the Pacii'ic War was witness to its 
iJIPortance, geographicall1 and strategicall1. Historian 
Samual Eliot Morison has stated, 
The control or sea communications through the 
Pacific and Indian oceans by the United States 
Bavy is a "must", ••• since the British have 
largely concentrated their now second-class 
Havy in home waters.24 
Should Southeast Asia fall into unfriendly hands which 
aight deny western access to these essential basic 
aaterials, the economies of the Western w0rld could be 
severely affected. Senator John Sparkman in a report to 
the Senate stated: 
If these states were to succumb to Communist 
imperialism, not only would they find suppression 
or their own liberties, but the free states or the 
Western Hemisphere would find themselves cut off 
t"rom vital raw materials and compelled to barter 
tor their freedom ••• and the aggressiveness 
with which the Communist pursue their aims makes 
it clear that they recog~ize the vital strategic 
importance of this area. 5 
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!he immediate security interest or Australia and New Zealand, 
neighboring as they do the long land masses or Southeast 
Asia, makes their voice in matters concerning this area an 
important one. Likewise, their immediate economic life is 
closely connected with the economic freedom and prosperity 
24samuel Eliot Morison, "American Strategy in the ~acif'ic Ocean,'' Oregon Historical 9,uarterl;y:, Vol. LXII 
o. l (March 1961J,1i4. 
25 -
4 " Senator John Sparkman., "The Far East and Southeast J>!ia. Report for .Senate Committee on .Foreign Relations, 
p.c~S~er 1957 1'\liishington: . Government .Printing Ofrice, 1957), 
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of the area. Any moves inimical to this :freedom would be 
of serious concern to Australasia.26 
Tbs postwar attention to this region by both Chinese 
and soviet Communist parties, aroused considerable uneasiness 
amODS some Southeast Asian and Western powers. But it had 
taken different forms. If one looks at the European pattern 
ot 18curity against possible Soviet aggression, he sees an 
integration of forces of the North Atlantic areas, along 
with a carefully planned economic integration in the form 
ot the Common Market. In A.sia, the pattern and tendency 
had been almost the opposite. The former empire protective 
alliances built on the concept of total imperial defense had 
been splintered and abandoned. This had isolated Australia 
and Bew Zealand to a very great degree. Here previous 
alliances lost their meaning as the British colonies found 
independence.27 
The newly independent nations of Southeast Asia 
became obsessed with their new status and nationhood and 
•••med to regard alliances of any type as a sign of weakness 
and an infringement of sovereignty. The flaunting of colors 
and national military forces seemed to become a necessary 
A 26Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper (eds.), 
~stralia in World Att'airs (Vancouver: University of 
itish rrol""umbia, . 1963), .p. 11. 
27Alvin Albinski, ".Australia's De!'ense Enigma," ~~i!••Foreign Policy Research Institute, IV No. 4 (1961}, 
exPression of this new sovereignty. The symbols of 
independence could not be compromised. Emancipation and 
nationalism were indivisible, and the nation•state, 
glorified in the literature of the West, would not play 
a secondary role in this era of independence. 28 Even 
though the organization and means for defense against 
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massive attack were lacking, each new small nation attempted 
supert'icial postures of independent military strength. 
Aside from the Japanese-imposed Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere, there had been other suggestions for 
regional alliances among the Asian nations in the past but 
none had been of much significance so far as collective 
defense is concerned. A.s early as 1946 there were moves 
toward formal regional relationships based on trade and 
cultural affinities, which might later lend themselves to 
common defense. General Aung San of Burma spoke for a type 
ot Asiatic connnonwealth and a Southeast Asia economic union, 
but his efforts were cut short by his assassination soon 
atterwards and none of his hopes ever developed. The next 
major move in this direction was the Baguio Conference, 
convened in 1950 by the Philippine government. Quite by 
coincidence, the u. s. Congress had expressed support for 
the creation or a joint organization of the free countries 
ot the Far East in the Mutual Defense Appropriation Act of 
(I . 28Rich~~d Butwell, Southeast Asia Toda1 ~Tomorrow 
ew York: Praeger, 1961), p. 172. ----
1950• Although no direct connection can be established 
~ en the two, it would appear that the initiative of be.,we 
tll8 Philippine government had the active and continuing 
•11Pport of the United States. While not a success, the 
Baguio Conference has been called a modest first step in 
29 d,efense cooperation. 
Prior to the Korean War the concern in Southeast 
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A•ia regarding CommWlist aspirations was not sufficient to 
arouse national leadership in the direction of collective 
aecurit1. Communist aims and maneuvers appeared to be 
nen•military in nature and took the form ot political 
pressures by minority groups in most instances, particu-
larl7 the overseas alien Chinese in Southeast Asia. Although 
the CoJllllunist threat to Southeast Asia was a growing danger 
in .American eyes, to the Asian leaders it was little more 
than a secondary concern in comparison with the more 
emotional issues of colonialism, nationalism, and neutrality. 
They believed that the proper reply to Communism was 
economic development, a rising standard of living, and 
goTernment programs which would provide for social weltare.30 
29 . 
0 Roger M. Smith, The Philippines and SEATO (Ithaca: ornell University Press,"'.""!959), p. 3. ~ . 
30Pb.ilip w. Thayer (ed.)., Nationalism and !To!ress t'; ~~~ As~a (Baltimore: The Johns Hopk!ns l'riss, 956), 
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The outbreak of the Korean War quickly dispelled 
1;hi• complacency. Communism now took the form of an overt 
ailit&rY threat to the security or Southeast Asia, and with 
the entry of the Chinese Communist "volllD.teers" in the war, 
the dangers or Chinese subversion and insurgency throughout 
Southeast Asia became very real indeed. After June 25, 1950 
lib.en a Soviet equipped and trained North Korean army began 
its assault against the Republic of Korea, a feverish series 
ot diplomatic events took place. The immediate action by 
the United Nations Security Council quickly rallied the 
non-Communist nations against the attack and approved of 
the strong military stand taken earlier by the United States. 
The American forces were later buttressed by other member 
nations. Desire for closer military alignments among the 
nations or Southeast Asia led to the formation of the Melby 
Mission. It was sent by the United States to 
determine the military build-up possible in each 
of the interested countries of Asia, to recommend 
priorities for arms shipments, and to discuss the 
composition of American military advisor1 groups 
which could be assigned to each country.Jl 
Except for Indonesia and Burma, these missions were well 
received. Negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty were 
aet in motion by the Dulles mission to Japan, and these 
culminated in a treaty or peace at San Francisco in 1951. 
'1-ticle 5 of the treaty recognized that "· •• Japan as a 
3lKing, 2£• £!.:!:.., P• 134. 
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sovereign nation possesses the inherent right or individual 
or collective defense and may voluntarily enter into 
collective security arrangements."32 This permitted an 
iJIDllediate bi-lateral mutual defense treaty between the 
united States and Japan. This was followed by a tripartite 
security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United States, the ANZUS Pact. A Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the Philippines and the United States preceded the 
ANZUS Pact by a few days, in August or 1951, and further 
tightened the collective security arrangements in Southeast 
Asia at this critical period.33 To further strengthen its 
commitments among the Pacific states, the United States 
concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of 
Korea in 1953 and a similar one with the Republic or China 
on Formosa. 
These bilateral pacts established for the United 
States a strong network or military agreements in the north 
and central Asian Pacific areas and secured, for military 
planning, a strategic chain of potential bases and resources 
which could be utilized and developed quickly to deter any 
further aggression. Another development or this period was 
the very strong warning issued by the United States of its 
new concept of "massive retaliation" in the event of recurrent 
Communist aggre~sion in any part of the world. This threat 
32 . Ibid., p. 146. 
33The Royal Institute of International Affairs; .2!?.• ~., p. 18. 
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obviously recognized the possibility that Communist planning 
aight easily include sporadic "brush fire" type of wars 
which could drain American resources and manpower relent-
lessly without, at the same time, exposing either Peking 
or Moscow to any retaliation. In defining the adminis• 
tration's strategy in further detail, Secretary of State 
Dulles signified the foreign policy implications of massive 
retaliation. He stated that local de.fenses would always 
be important, but there was no local defense which alone 
would contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. 
Therefore, local defenses would have to be reinforced by 
the .further deterrent or massive retaliatory power. He 
declared .further that when a potential aggressor is 
glutted with manpower, he might assume that resistance 
would be confined to manpower. 
He might be tempted to attack in places where such 
superiority was decisive. The way to deter aggres-
sion is .for the .free community to be willing and 
able to respond vigorously at places and with means 
of its own choosing.34 
There was immediate emphasis on mobility of forces, with 
troops held in a central reserve, ready to strike in any 
part of the world with highly mobile nav.al, air, and 
ILllphibious units. The use of nuclear weapons was implied 
in this newly defined massive retaliation concept. 
State .34statement of John Foster Dulles, Department of 
Press Release No. 139, March ,16, 1954. 
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These new strategic doctrines were not accepted 
without debate. Within the administration itself, the 
»emoeratic opposition questioned the wisdom of committing 
one to full scale war when merely the suppression of "brush 
tire" type of provoca~ions with limited arms would be 
equally effective.35 Debates weighing the relative values 
ot the foot soldier versus the megaton bomb were rampant 
in the press, both in the United 'States and abroad. European 
tears that carelessness or intemperate decisions of a few 
men might embroil the entire world in a nuclear catastrophe 
were not without some foundation. Vice President Nixon 
gaTe an explanation which did little to allay these fears. 
He stated: 
Rather than let the Communists nibble us to 
death all over the world in little wars, we would 
rely in the future primarily on our massive 
mobile retaliatory power which we could use in 
our discretion against the major source of 
aggression at .the time and place that we choose. 
We adjusted our armed strength to meet the re-
quirements of this new concept and, what was just 
as important, we let the world and the Communists 
know what we intended to do.36 
A great restraint was shown by the United States 
in seeking support for its policies. Dulles did not feel 
that the time was practicable to draw a line which would 
bring all the free peoples of the Pacific and East Asia 
35 . . -
King, .21?• £l!., p. 182. 
36 . New !!2.£! Times, March 14, 1954. 
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a formal mutual security area. He thought that nations 1nto 
as Indonesia and Burma which had just won liberation 8uch 
_ trom Japanese aggression and political freedom from 
t rn colonialism would hesitate to assume security rela" Wes e 
tionships either with Japan or with the Western powers, and 
as a practical matter, 
• in Indo-China and Malaya, assistance must be 
~i;en largely through France and the United Kingdom, 
a procedure which many in Asia find repellant, as 
promoting ''colonial imperialism." Some countries 
are yet unable or unwilling to qualify for definite 
security arrangement under the Vandenberg formula of 
"continuous and effective self help and mutual aid." 
Lastly ••• the United States should not assume 
formal commitments which overstrain its present 
capabilities ••• treaties now made involve islands 
where security is strongly influenced by sea and air 
power ••• 37 
Despite the bitter Korean experience and the Indo-China 
crisis, there remained a natural disinclination on the 
part of the United States to show any strong initiative 
in creating a collective security arrangement for all of 
Southeast Asia. This reticence and studied restraint was 
entirely within the bounds of good and patient diplomacy. 
An error in assumption or timing in such matters could have 
serious adverse propaganda value in the Communist press. 
Still working toward security the United States feared that 
the cessation of hostilities in Korea would lead to the 
diversion of additional Communist pressure to Indo-China. 
Ii' 37 Joh~ Foster Dulles, "Security in the Pacific," 
..Qrei~n Affairs, Vol. XXX, Noo 2 (January, 1952), 182 • . 
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Consequently there were strong arguments for a more active 
United states role in establishing a Far Eastern security 
pact.38 
There were calls for an American sponsored NATO 
tJPe tr~aty for the Asian area and this bo~d idea had 
strong support in the Philippines and Thailand. But the 
otticial American attitude was much more restrained. The 
United States would give every support to a collective 
security arrangement in the Asian area, but it was largely 
up to the nations of Southeast Asia themselves to decide 
upon the scope and time for such an organization and for 
them to take the initiative in arriving at a meeting of 
minds on the subject. In October, 1953 the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter s. 
Robertson, had this to say on the matter: 
Those both here and in the Far East who have 
recognized the desirability of a common defensive 
effort in the Asian Pacific area have looked to 
the United States government to exert its influ-
ence in favor of such a pact. We continue to 
believe, however, that any effective Asian 
Pacific organization must come about as a result 
of the Asian•s own initiative; that it must wait 
upon a general appreciation among the Asians of 
the desirability of collective action in attacking 
their common problems. This is clearly not a 
field in which outsiders can usefully assert 
themselves. We do not wish to give the impression 
that we are trying to hustle or joggle our friends 
across the Pacific, because we are not. Any moves 
3BKing, .2£• ~., p. 148. 
to be made in the direction of regional organization 
are clearly up to them.39 
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Whether the small nations of Southeast Asia were yet ready 
to join in common interest and defense of their lands and 
liberties was not long in being determined, and the 
disaster to the French armies in Indo-China at the hands 
ot the Vietminh Communist forces was to become the catalyst. 
39oepartment of S,tate Press Release No. 549, 1953, 
quoted by .King, .QE.• .£!:!:,., P• J.49. 
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REACTIONS TO PROPOSALS FOR coLLmTIVE ACTION 
Events in Indo-China in 1953 and 1954 aroused grave 
ooacern among the nations of Southeast Asia and this concern 
iparked hectic political and diplomatic activity among them 
•• tbeY re-examined their security positions. Among the 
Asian nations, ethnic differences still played a large part 
in keeping them apart. Old enmities and suspicion of the 
neighboring country still persisted, resulting largely .from 
long histories of border wars. Differences in languages, 
41aleets, societal forms, and religion, further complicated 
ettorts for political and economic cooperation and so long 
as inadequate and archaic educational systems prevailed, the 
.. jority of the people would continue to harbor these 
hatreds and suspicions. In addition, any pact with the 
Western World which might suggest a neo-colonial organization 
with non-Asian leadership, would certainly meet very strong 
opposition. The only immediate existing regional group in 
Southeast Asi~ were the Columbo Powers made up of India, 
Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesiaw•so named .from their 
meeting in April of 1954 at Columbo, where they attempted to 
torm an economic bloc for mutual development, supported to 
•ome extent by the British Commonwealth nations. Defense or 
Political alignment was not an organic part of the Columbo 
Plan. 
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The question of collective security for this area 
found e~ch government concerned, including Australia and 
le¥ Zealand, faced with very strong political considera• 
•ions at home. The following study examines, in part, some 
ot the problems faced by both those countries who became 
aignatories to the Manila Treaty, and those who refused to 
participate in this regional alliance. 
I. NATIONS WHICH ACCEPTED COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 
In the case of Australia and New Zealand, there was 
close accord with the concern of the United States for 
Aaian security. Very important to the ·decision later made 
b7 Australia and New Zealand,· is an understanding of the 
ABZUS Pact as a precursor of the Manila alliance. 1 Signed 
at San Francisco on September 1, 1951, this security treaty 
between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States was, 
in tact, part of an inter-related system of defense arrange-
.. nts which steI1D11ed from the Japanese Peace Treaty. These 
included, among others, the treaty between the United States 
and the Philippines, and the treaty between Nationalist 
China and the United States. 
Similar to the NATO agreement, the ANZUS Pact was 
4es1gned to conform to the spirit and design of the United 
1
see Appendix c, p. 162, for text of the ANZUS Treaty. 
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Jations Cbal'ter. But, unlike the NATO Pact, it di~ avoid 
the constitutional difficulties which might arise in the 
di"a or the defense commitments and caref'ully left the 11or ~ 
aoTereign power to declare war to the member states. Pro" 
yiaion was made for the independent constitutional 
procedures within the ANZUS Pact (and all subsequent defense 
agreements involving the United States). In this instance, 
the defense provisions were made to read, 
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the 
Pacific Area on any or the Parties would be 
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares 
that it would act to meet the common danger i~ 
accordance with its constitutional processes. 
Realistically, the Australians saw this trea~y not as a 
tormal NATO structure, with definite •command' -responsi-
bilities, but rather as a re-expression of a "Monroe 
Doctrine" theory which bound the United States to the 
assistance or Australia and New Zealand in case or need. 
'1'he Australian Minister or External A:f'fairs had this to 
aa1 about the alliance: 
ANZUS provides the means whe.reby we can consult, 
government to government, with the strongest nation 
in the Pacific, the United States of America•-not 
only the strongest nation but also our firm and 
declared ally. ANZUS gives Australia access to the 
thinking and planning of the American Administration 
at the highest political and military level ••• 
Finally, ANZUS ensures that our own interests, both 
Political and military are kept before the United 
States-•and this is or major importance when we 
2Australia, Treaty Series, 1952 No. 2, cited by 
Bo1al Inst., .2.E.• cit., p. 175. 
consider the complexity of the issues facing the 
united States and the many countries .whose 
separate interests must be taken into account by 
the Americans in global planning and strategy.3 
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!he Pact recognized the immediate concern of the signatories 
,
0 
the CoJ11D1Unist threat and aligned Australia and New 
Zealand with the United States in an endeavor to strengthen 
the security of the countries of Southeast Asia. By the 
terms of the treaty, it gave Australia and New Zealand 
assurances of American military support and assistance in 
the event of an armed attack. It served as well to allay 
the tears of a segment of the Australian public of a 
resurgence of Japanese militarism following the signing of' 
the Japanese P~ace Treaty.4 
There is further intimation that ANZUS was a pre-
cursor to the Manila Treaty by noting the wording of the 
Preamble to the Treaty which states that it looks toward 
the development of a more "comprehensive system of regional 
aecuri ty in the Pacific Area. 11 This phrase is again 
repeated in Article 8 as a justification for impowering the 
.UZUS Council, 
to maintain a consultative relationship with States, 
Regional Organizations, Associations of States or 
other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position 
to .further the purposes of' this Treaty and to con-
tribute to the security of that Area. 
3R. G. Casey, Friends. and Neighbors (Melbourne: 
P. W. Cheshire, 1955), .pp. 53~. · · · · 
1 4o.ordon Green;ood an.d Norman Harper (eds.), Australia li6!orld Affairs (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 3)' p. 62. . . 
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It is interesting to observe that ANZUS Council activities 
bf.Ve continued in this spirit up to the present time. 
reoe nt report of the SEA.TO Council at Bangkok declared: 
United States officials e.x;pressed special 
appreciation for recent contributions to the war 
effort by their ANZUS partners. The Council noted 
with satisfaction that the members of ANZUS had 
increased their assistance to South Vietnam. since 
the meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
tion Council in April, 1964. The ANZUS ministers 
agreed that they should remain prepared, if 
necessary, to take furthar concrete steps within 
their respective cagabilities to assure the defeat 
or this aggression.~ 
A 
The exclusion of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS 
Pact was a sensitive issue in both Britain am.d Australia. 
British interest in the Pacific and her historic participa-
tion in the affairs of the area certainly could not be 
easily dismissed, nor could her strength there in the form 
ot naval, land, and air forces in both Malaya and Hong 
:long. Considerable bitterness and resentment was felt iR 
Great Britain that so prominent a .friend and long time 
United States ally should have not been invited to join in 
\he agreement. At the time the Pact was signed, the 
British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, tried to 
•1nimize the significance 0£ the United Kingdom's exclusion 
when he stated to the house 0£ Commons that, 
it would not have been unwelcome to us 1£ we had 
been included in the proposed pact • • • His 
A 11 
5
"SEA-TO: 19.54-1964 A Stabilizing Factor in Southeast 6~:t,~ Quoted in International Organization Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 
,;;J9. 
M ·esty's Government in the United Kingdom are, 
:;ertheless, entirely satisfied that Australia 
nnd New Zealand should represent the interests of ~he Un~ted Kingdom and the Commonwealth as a 
whole. 
A rew months later, the new Conservative Prime Minister, 
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Winston Churchill, did not conceal his feelings when he 
stated to the House of Commons that he had inherited the 
situation and regretted the manner in which the ANztJS Pact 
was arrived at without British participation. 
However, there were strong and compelling reasons why 
the United States objected to the inclusion of Great Britain 
in the ANZUS Treaty. First, the United States was by no 
means sympathetic at that time to any arrangement which 
would have committed American obligations to the defense 
of colonial territories such as Malaya, Hong Kong, and 
British Borneo. And secondly, if Britain were included in 
the military provisions of the Pact because of her geographic 
and colonial interests in the area, so would it be necessary 
to invite the Netherlands and France as well. This was not 
the intent of' the ANZUS Pact. The alliance was very limited 
in scope to the three English speaking Pacific powers and 
was, in fact, very restricted in its military authority and 
Planning. This would consist of the ANZUS Council of Military 
Starr Members who were to meet occasionally at Pearl Harbor, 
W 6George Modelski (ed.), SEATO: filz Studies (Melbourne: 1
• .Cb.eshire Ltd., 1962), p. 55. 
Wellington, or Melbourne .for military stat'£ discussions. 
the military emphasis on the ANZUS Pact alone 
!lJU81 
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restricted its interest and scope in the Pacific. At the 
ti.118 the Treaty was signed, the representatives o.r the 
.,aber nations emphasized that this was intended to be just 
the beginning of building up security arrangements in the 
Paoitic. 
The press tended to minimize the Treaty's importance 
and .trequently made unfair comparisons between ANZUS and 
D!O. Such reactions gave early strong arguments .for 
participation in the larger, more comprehensive, alliance 
which was yet to come. Australian hopes .for a strong 
SA!O-tJPe agreement did not take into consideration the 
crucial di.f.ference between the North Atlantic nations and 
those or Southeast Asia. The same mature political conditions 
tor such a NATO-type agreement simply did not exist. 
B. G. Casey, in defending the Treaty said: 
We still do not know how such a wider system of 
security will come into being. For the present, 
the essential political conditions for such a 
s1stem do not appear to exist. I do not find that 
there is yet that co:rmnunity of interest and readiness 
to assume, in advance, far reaching and precise 
military obligationa on which a treaty of alliance 
like NATO is based.1 
However unreasonable the press and public opinion might have 
been regarding tbB significance o.r the ANZUS, the Pact has 
Moel 7current Notes, XXIV, November 1953, quoted in 
elski, 22.~., P• 57. 
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essential part in the Pacific defense structure. pla1ed an 
Al'}lough the SEATO organization has superceded to a large 
extent most of the functions of the ANZUS Treaty, it remains 
la effect and its councils continue to be held. The ANZUS 
C011JlCil held its thirteenth annual meeting in Washington on 
3911 17•18, 1964, attended by the New Zealand Prime Minister 
leitb Holyoake, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 
a• well as the Secretary of External Affairs for Australia, 
8 P. Basluck. The fact th.at the ANZUS Council of Ministers 
itill meets regularly, as well as the Military Staff Council, 
would support the contention that this alliance has a 
oharacter and function distinct from SEA.TO, and that function 
is playing an important part in South Vietnam today. 
A Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and 
the United States preceded the ANZUS Pact by a few days 
and t'm'ther tightened the collective security arrangements 
in Southeast Asia at this critical period.9 . President Truman 
1tated on April 18, 1951, 
The whole world knows that the United States 
recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines 
would be looked upon by the United States as 
dangerous to its own peaci0and safety and that it would act accordingly. 
a· (~ Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 1310, 
•gust 3, 1964), 146. 
9 'lh..~ See Appendix B, P• 159 for text of the United States• &~~lippine Mutual Defense Treaty. 
lo · · New ~ Times, April 18, 1951. 
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• 
association with the United States in defense matters 
010• 
... certainly not new to the Philippines. Of the many 
.. vlJ independent Southeast Asian states, she alone had 
d a long political and military apprenticeship with 
.. l"T8 
~ United States. Unlike Thailand or Pakistan, the 
lldlippines had a strong American orientation which 
logically resulted from her history as an American depen-
tencJ until 1946. Asi~e from many connnon traditions and 
institutions, the close military association of the two 
eo11Dtries during the war with the Japanese created close 
and binding friendships between many American political 
and llilitary leaders. In addition, the immediate outpour• 
1Dg ot American aid for indemnity and reconstruction 
following the Japanese surrender amounted to more than 
1.5 billion doilars. 11 This made possible the early 
apectacular recovery of the Philippine economy. The manner 
ot granting Philippine independence, as promised prior to 
the war, further created an atmosphere of mutual trust and 
respect. Despite this new independence, the Philippines 
relied upon the United States in matters of defense and 
&creed to the retention of American naval bases at Subic 
Ba7 and Sangley Point, as well as an air· base at Clark Field 
tor the u. s. Air Force. Whether these extraterritorial 
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t would continue palatable to the Philippine citizen rigb 8 . 
aac! the opposition parties after !Ull economic and political 
1Jldependence was achieved, had to be seriously weighed by 
both Philippine and American defense planners. As economic 
growth increased, so would economic dependency on the 
United states decrease and with it the day to day ties and 
oontacts that would keep the two nations in close associa-
ti on. 
As an insular republic of over 7,000 islands with a 
yery heterogeneous tribal complex, the Philippines faced an 
illaense task of internal domestic development which fully 
occupied the postwar government for many years. Stable 
goYernment, land redistribution, reconstruction, unemploy-
aent, and Communist subversion, were among the many problems 
to be resolved. From the start, the Philippine leaders took 
a strong anti...Communist stand during the transition from 
colonialism to independence. Aside from the organized 
Bukbalahap rebellion during the early 1950s, there had 
been little evidence of militant communism, (although some 
ot the areas coming more recently under the influence of 
Indonesian political pressure, especially in the Moslem 
ialandJ, have witnessed some unrest). During the Korean 
Var, the Philippine government bec~e strongly aware of the 
Potential dange.r of Communist subversion, and, still 
bitterly conscious of the Japanese occupation not many years 
before, this may have stirred interest in the need for 
oollective security. It was directed almost entirely 
to~ard the United States. 
After a meeting in 1949 with Generalissimo Chiang 
Kaishek of the republic of China, President Elpidio Quirino 
].auncbed a series of talks among Asian leaders on tbe 
iubject of some form of Pacific pact which might offer a 
118tem of regional defense. In August of the same yea:r, 
be expressed the same views before the United States Senate 
and received good support for his proposals. With Nationalist 
China and the Republic of Korea in favor, he called for a 
conference of Asian leaders for May 1950 to take place at 
Bagiuo, in the Philippines. This conference was attended 
b7 representatives of Australia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Few or the 
participants had authority to indulge in little more than 
exploratory talks on :matters of collective security. Other 
aspects of mutual area interest were taken up, including 
trade and cultural exchanges, but few definitive recom• 
12 aendations were made. The effort of Carlos P. RolllUlo at 
the United Nations during . 1950 to ''secure a closer union 
aaong the peoples of Southeast Asia, dedicated to the 
ll&intenance of peace and freedom in the region through 
appropriate methods of political, economic, and cultural 
. "i2 . 
0 ,Roger M. Smith, The PhiliRpines and SEATO (Ithaca: 0 Pnell University Press,71959), P• 3. · · -
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tion with one another" did not succeed as hoped. 
••opera . 
sident of the conference, Romulo was authorized in A• pre 
tib8 tinal statement to communicate recommendations to the 
participating governments and make suggestions on the 
111Ple.mentation of the few agreements arrived at. These 
related to cultural and social matters and had little 
,.litical significance. 
Although disappointing for the Philippine leaders, 
•bi• conference did manage to bring together the significant 
leaders of Southeast A.sia far talks on subjects of common 
eonoern. This was an accomplishment. The Indo-China crisis, 
11)doh tollowed so soon after the Korean armistice, was an 
eTent that strongly influenced the Philippine decision to 
work in the direction of a security pact for the Pacific, 
aillilar to NATO. However, prior to this, Claro M. Recto, 
an opposition leader, had wielded wide influence in 
adTocating a Philippine orientation toward Asian neighbors, 
'••ed on national and racial grounds. With the Undersecretary 
tor Foreign Affairs, they guided foreign policy with some 
••coesa on the slogan at t1 Asia for the As'ians. t1 l3 Aware of 
\be •ollllting concern both .by the conservatives . in government 
lad. the military leaders over this extreme nationalist 
Philosophy, President Ramon Magasaysay made a strong statement 
194.$ 1 13Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomaci of Southeast Asia: • 958 (New York: _ Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 84. -
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- h 10 1954 reversing this trend in P.b.ilippine•American 
Oil Jlal'O ' 
04 
Philippine-Asian relations. Wlth .full approval o:f his 
00
ngressional leaders he asserted: 
There is no incompatibility between the political 
and economic ties and solidarity o:f aspirations in 
eace and in war, which have bound our two countries 
ltbe Philippines and the United States) :for more than 
half' a century, and our warm desire to .become good 
neighbors in Asia in a united e:f:fort, imposed by 
geographical propinquity and racial af.fi·nities, to 
achieve the general prosperity o:f this region. 
Rather, these two comple.mentary objectives should 
give us that balance~ foreign policy which we have 
lacked in the past.14 
Bllt, unlike Thailand, her security needs were not so 
c1emanding. She was sheltered fro?ll the C0mmunist China 
.. inland by a friendly Formosa, the u. s. Seventh Fleet, 
and hundreds of miles of the China Sea. This geographical 
1ecurity became a source of Philippine reluctance to enter 
iato any formal declarations or warnings against .further 
aggression by the Viet-Minh and Chinese in Ind0•China. 
llhen Secretary of State Dulles approached the countries or 
South.east Asia for such a joint warning, President 
Kagsa1say was wary and did not wish to lend support to any 
.. aaure which would antagonize .fellow Asians and possibly 
oontinue the French colonial presence in Indo..China. But 
1n April 1954, Magsaysay gave support to any moves that 
Would establish a NATO type alliance in the Pacific area, 
Provided that the following conditions ware met: 
Pi st that the right of Asian peoples to self-de• :mi~ation is respected; and second, that the 
te lippines be given a plain and unequivocal 
Pbiarantee of United States hel~5in case of attack ~der our Mutual Defense Pact. 
!be•• preconditions guaranteeing self•determination were 
J.a'9r to be attached to the Manila Treaty in the form of 
~ Pacific Charter, inspired and 'sponsored by Ramon 
1ag1a1say. 
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In the case of Pakistan, the history of its associa-
•ions with the United States in any alliance was very recent 
aacl limited indeed. Quite dramatically, the date of the 
SBA.TO agreement marked a further deterioration of relations 
between Pakistan and India and the United .States and India, 
vi'h a corresponding improvement in India's relations with 
Oa1111unist China. The initial links with Karachi started 
cblring the government of Mohammed Ali following his visit to 
Vaahington at the invitation of President Eisenhower. As the 
teraer Pakistan Ambassador in Washingt@n, his personal eon• 
kots and influence am'ong Americans was considerable. 
Z...diately after his elevation to the office of Prime 
Minister in 1953, his initial request for emergency food aid 
vaa soon forthcoming. 
1111.lion tons of wheat. 
The United States quickly granted a 
Concurrently, talks were begun toward 
a autual military assistance agreell'Snt to strengthen Pak:istan•s 
So ~5Rep~blic of the Philippines, Official Gazette, Vol. 
, 11 (Apr11 1954), quoted in Fifield, !h!, .Diplomacy of Southeast 
--.;;!. p. 102. , . . " 
1 in the general defense of the Middle East. With J'O e 
rakistan divided geographically, bordering both on 
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So•theast Asia and the Middle East, her pivotal position 
ill the geographic and political divisions of these areas 
wa• quickly recognized. The nation's capitol, Karachi, is 
situated in West Pakistan and its natural political affilia-
tions tend to follow Moslem patterns.16 As a member of the 
ColllJllbO Plan, she was the only member of that group to 
•ltimately become a signatory to the Manila pact. Both 
Dalles and Vice President Nixon made visits to Pakistan 
ill the same year. These visits were returned by the then 
Pakistan Commander•in-Chtef, Ayub Khan, and during his stay 
in Washington., a Mutual ·security Assistance agreement was 
1igned May 19, 1954, followed by an agreement for friendly 
oooperation with Turkey in the west. 17 With these essential 
a11ociations binding her closely to the non•communist, 
•on-neutral blocs, there was little hesitation on the part 
ot the United States and others to invite Pakistan to 
participate in talks regarding a collective defense agreement 
in South.east Asia. 
The motives which prompted Pakistan's leaders to 
enter into both the Mutual Assistance pact with the United 
l6The Royal Institate of Iaternational A:f'fairs, ..e,:e. !,.1~., p. 28. 
17 Modelski, .2.:2• ~., P• 131. 
and later the Manila Treaty are somewhat obscure • 
.._tes 
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leading up to these associations offer some interest-
.,ents 
iDI conjectures. It is interesting to note that Pakistan 
... not among the Southeast Asian nations that Dulles had 
eriginally appr~ached for a joint warning to Communist 
CldD&, although he did contact Pakistan and Ceylon a few 
4&JS later for consultations on "general matters" relating 
, 0 southeast Asia.
18 The ~ !.2£! Times reported in May that 
1aldstan was bent upon bringing all the members of the 
Columbo Powers except India into the alliance, thus isolating 
ID4ia politically and militarily and rendering Pakistan 
leadership in Southeast Asia paramount.19 
During a visit of the Pakistan Foreign Minister 
Zatrullah Khan to 'Washington, he placed great emphasis on 
the Connunist threat to East Pakistan, and the necessity 
tor his government to keep troops alerted .in that area. 
Kia visit was the last step in paving the way for Pakistan's 
Pl'••ence at the Manila conference. While little has since 
been heard from Pakistan about the Communist threat to 
Bast Pakistan in particular, these early alarms gav~ weight 
to its agreements tor full association in SEA.TO. It would 
appe&l' that despite the morbid fears of aggression against 
this eastern border, one of the real intentions in the 
P• 132. 19New ~ Times, May 28, 1954. 
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alignment with the Manila Pact powers was to create a 
•e potential against possible Indian military adventures 
,_ren ... 
,..sulting trom the Kashmir issue, and to give it a strong 
)land as well in this territorial dispute. Considering the 
reluctance of the other Columbo Powers to join in the Manila 
!reatJ, Pakistan's acceptance did help in c~ntributing to 
tM •Asian content" o:f the membership. 
The issues which :faced Thailand during this period 
.. re mu~h dif:ferent :from those of Pakistan or the Philippines. 
!here could be no question that her geographical position on 
the mainland o:f Asia put her in a most vulnerable spot 
regarding military and subversive encroa.cbment from Communist 
China. A small but stable state, Thailand has had a 
reputation for adroit political maneuver which managed to 
keep her independent for centuries, despite colonial domina-
tions surrounding her. By carefully playing the ambitions 
ot the French in Indo-China against those of the British 
in Burma and Malaya, a remarkable history of uninterrupted 
independence was maintained, much to the envy of all Asia 
(the Japanese occupation during World War II notwithstanding). 
Kan7 critics think Thailand's readiness to compromise 
Principles in pursuit o:f this independence might not make 
her a staunch partner in any alliance. Whether this is 
•till true is difficult to say, but it is interesting to 
note that the same political leaders who had led Thailand 
an accommodation with the Japanese in 1941, without pto 
token resistance to the invasion, were the same 
•••ll 
pelitical clique which led Thailand to join the Manila 
Paot ot 1954• 
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A look back to the Thai position in 1941 is important. 
It is known that historically, Thai thinking, both political 
and economic, came under strong British influence. Even 
tod•J the leading export houses for tin, timber, rubber, 
aJld copra are essentially British. Such names as Anglo-Thai 
Cerp. Ltd., Bombay-Burmah Ltd., The Chartered Bank of India, 
1lib9 Hong Kong &: Shanghai Banking Corp., go back to the days 
ot Britain's Empire and were, indeed, appendages of that 
aaae system. The historic British concern for Thailand was 
its own interests in Malaya and Burma, and, naturally, 
Great Britain feared the presence of any unfriendly govern-
aent in Thailand. Nevertheless, this British orientation 
vaa ot little va,lue in 1941 when Thai Premier P.h.ibun Songram 
bowed to the threat of invasion and joined in full partner-
ahip with the Japanese military occupation.20 While British 
forces were pi~ned down in the fruitless defense of Malaya, 
they were unable to rally sufficient defense for themselves 
-
and could give no thought to assisting Thailand. The failure 
ot any Thai resistance left Britain's northern defenses open 
·20 · . . . 
It t John F. Cady, "The Historical Background of United 
h ab es Policy in Southeast Asia," quoted in Henderson, 
-
0 lems .2.£ United States Policy, P• 7. 
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and contributed very much to the British capitulation at 
111gapore. 
Thai apologists point to the 1941 debacle as a 
n in failure to implement treaties of friendship with 1esso 
iolid guarantees of military assistance. 
In 1954 Thailand's def'ense problems involved two 
main categories, external aggression and subversion. While 
not bordering directly on Communist China, her northern 
neighbor, Laos, is a friendly but small and weak buffer. 
!o the east lies Cambodia and Vietnam, while to the west 
1• tound Burma, with Malaya to the south. Her shores on 
the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean create a considerable 
coastal defense problem. The national and political splin-
tering created by various ethnic groups found along Thailand's 
borders has always made her an easy target for treachery 
and subversion during any overt military action. During 
the 1950•s Malaya was heavily involved with the ''emergency," 
battling a serious threat of admitted Communist insurgents; 
Burma, too, was faced with similar insurgency from the 
Karens and a Communist rebellion, while in Indo-China, a 
bitter struggle ensued between the French and the Communist 
Viet-Minh. Consequently there were very strong reasons for 
!'hailand 1 s concern for her own security. Above all, there 
had persisted ror centuries the problem of the thousands of 
alien Chinese, whose loyalties to their adopted fatherland 
had always been suspect. This potential threat of subversion 
baa been a most important consideration for all the mainland 
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of Southeast Asia, and will be examined in greater 
oelJJltrieS 
J.eDt>th in a following section of this study. 
Tb.Us Thailand, of all the nations of Southeast Asia, 
11&8 been the most directly concerned geographically in its 
iecuritJ and defense problems. The Thai signature to the 
lanila Treaty was not her first step in mutual cooperation. 
As early as the late 1940's, successive Thai governments 
ll&Y• turned to the United States for assistance in internal 
4eYelopment. Foreign aid and Point Four projects have 
proliferated through.out the provinces of Thailand. Road 
111tems, hydro, and irrigation schemes, were developed with 
American help. Cultural and social ties with the United 
States were strengthened with exchange programs, Fulbright 
grants, training programs in mechanical fields, and medical 
aid programs. A considerable amount of interest in inte.rnal 
1ecurity and stability directed American efforts to a broad 
police training program, long before eny thought was given 
to military aid. This early apprenticeship with Washington. 
was further expanded at the outbreak of the Korean War, when 
!hailand contributed a contingent to the United Nations 
forces. These forces were trained and equipped almost 
entirely through the U • s. Military Advisory programs• 21 
21 · . 
8 On 24 November Pravda announced that the United £!:t!s was transforming 1$ailand into a military base for 
ll1 r can aggression. It .maintained that the technical and 
lita.ry agreements, concluded between Thailand and the 
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of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, Thailand indicated At the time 
to play a part with the United States, had the 
a readiness 
•a Conference not ar.rived at a satisfactory cease-fire. 
Gen•• 
Vith this recent background of close military and political 
Ciation with the West, it is not surprising that Thailand &180 
toWld herself a keystone in the Manila alliance with her 
oapitol, Bangkok, eventually to become the head of the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. 
In addition to . these nations that accepted invita-
•ions to join in the Manila conference, there must be 
oonsidered, as well, the arguments of those states which, 
though invited, refused to participate after careful and 
long debate, in most instances. Some, of course, like the 
f?oee states of Inda-China were disqaalified by the parties 
to the Geneva Agreement. It is not surprising that Communist 
China and the Soviet, Union rose with alarm at the spectre 
ot a military alliance openly dedicated to the containment 
ot Communism within its present borders in Southeast A.sia. 
And it is not surprising that they would bring strong 
pressures and propaganda forces to bear on the nations of 
Aiia in an attempt to limit the effectiveness of such an 
alliance. 
:n1ted States .had established complete American military 
(ontrol. M. Beloff, Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia 
Oxtord: Ox.ford University Press, 1953), P• 240-;---
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II· NATIONS WHICH REJECTED COLLECTIVE DEFENSE 
. . 
Of the so-called Columbo Powers invited to the Manila 
oonterence, India was without doubt the most important. By 
territory, population, and resources, she was certainly the 
aost influential as a counter-balance to Chinese Communist 
expansion and the new Chinesepolitical orientation of the 
border countries. 22 And India's influence and cultural 
attiliations with Southeast Asia were centuries old. For 
i;hese reasons alone, she would have been a giant mnong the 
.A.aian participants. But the official attitude of the Indian 
govermnent from the start was one of hostility. Even during 
the preliminary hearings on the Manila invitation, India 
took a strong position against any Asian participation and 
clid much to dissuade the other Columbo Powers who had 
interest in such an alliance. Her strong pressure on Burma 
and Ceylon will be discussed below. One cause of the Indian 
Government's opposition to the Manila Treaty was the prevail~ 
ing mistrust of most Indians for British and American motives. 
Ber long period of imperial domination had not been forgotten 
in six short years. And her fear of Pakistan's new strength, 
which was growing with Am~rican assistance, further hardened 
her attitude against the alliance. With her buffer to the 
north, Tibet, already absorbed by China, Indian sensitivity 
p. 93. 
22 . 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, .2.E• .£1.i., 
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to cbinese displeasure was very acute indeed. The border 
along the McMahon line were a constant political 
u1putes 
u-ritant between China and India. And this new political 
aligDlllent appeared to worry Prime Minister Nehru even more. 
lfbeD he received the joint London-Washington inquiry asking 
tor views on the projected conference, he advised the 
Indian Parliament that the government did not intend to 
depart from its avowed policy of neutrality, and intended 
to promote peace and resolve conflicts by peaceful negotia-
tion, rather than by accentuation and threats or display 
ot torce. His opposition became even more adamant as the 
Manila conference drew to a close. He had this to say: 
Our Hon. members may remember to old days~•they 
appear to be old days he said • • • when Great 
Powers had spheres of influence in Asia and 
elsewhere-•of course the countries of Asia were 
too weak to do anything. The quar.rel was between 
the big powers, and they, therefore, sometimes came 
to an agreement about dividing the countries into 
spheres of influence. It seems to me this particular 
Manila Treaty is looking dangerously in this direction 
ot spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful 
countries, because ultimately it is the big and 
power.tUl countries that will decide and not the two 
or three weak and small Asian countries that may be 
allied to tbem.23 
lehru•s conviction that any collective security pact which 
included former colonial powers represented a reactionary 
colonial thl>eat to the area, that it would be an obstacle 
2.3 SIA " Rosemary Brissenden, "India's Opposition to ,01:o~i ~Australian Journal .of Politics~ History, 
, _ o. 2 . (November 1960),~o5. . .. 
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to peace in the area and that Asian nations adhering to it 
••re acting contrary to the best interests of the Asian 
was reiterated time and again in his dealings peoples, 
1fith the other members of the Columbo Powers. 
The Indian government expressed its official views 
D the subject subsequent to the treaty, in early January 
19ss at Madras during a meeting of the Indian Congress Party. 
It said that, 
the establishment of a South East Asian Defence 
Organization by some Great Powers of the West and 
some States in South East Asia, is regrettable and 
has added to the insecurity of that region and 
extended the area of cold war.24 
!he resolution further stated that peace could only be 
ll&intained by the five principles of co•existence and it 
welcomed the proposal for a meeting of all the independent 
l.aian and African states, a proposal which led to the 
Bandung Conference of April 1955. 
Of the invited Columbo Powers, Ceylon, like Pakistan, 
waa inclined to accept the proposals. Her relations with 
Iadia, though close, had long been strained by the problem 
of large migratory invasions of South India Tamils, mostly 
YI.grant unemployed laborers in search of food and work. 
India did little to control the emigration and Ceylonese 
officials likewise had difficulty in coping with the situation. 
24Royai Institute of International Affairs, .Q.E.• .2.!!•, p. 94. 
Vitb similar heritages of British imperialism, they held 
PJlilar suspicions of Western ways. But the Ceylonese 
rr1.11e Minister, Sir John Kotalawalla, regarded any move 
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t11at might strengthen Ceylon's prestige in the Commonwealth 
aad world as a national advantage and did not like to 
.na~ordinate his country's ambitions to those of India. This 
)lad been the case during the Empire. 
India's attitude appeared to stiffen when Pakistan 
and Ceylon began to show a readiness to participate in the 
lanila conference. Although of a regional nature, the long 
411pute between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir problem 
bad been a bitter major foreign policy issue that had even 
reached the portals of the United Nations. In fact, at this 
period, each considered the other a threat more awesome 
•han Chinese expansion to the south. 25 With India and 
Indonesia leading the core of opposition among the Columbo 
Powers, it was left to Sir John Kotalawalla and U Nu of 
:au.a to challenge. this leadership and promote a more 
apirited attitude towards the problems of Southeast Asian 
4etense. It was his intention to encourage more open dis• 
911.asion of the issue. With this in mind, Kotalawalla proposed 
\bat a meeting be held in Rangoon to reconsider earlier 
Policy statements regarding the Manila plan during a meeting 
C iwnbo ministers in Ceylon. Both Burma and Pakistan ot 0 
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vere anxious to participate in such a meeting but Nehru 
~nt h was too busy to leave. 26 When Kotalawalla ata ted t.uo. e 
'11eD suggested a meeting in New Delhi for the convenience 
ot the Indian leader, Nehru admitted that he thought the 
Colwnbo decisions were already made and open conversations 
would have a divisive effect on the solidarity of the 
ColU111bO Powers. Indian diplomacy at this juncture appeared 
to have three major goals: (1) to secure unanimous Columbo 
Power rejection of the Manila invitation, (2) to accommodate 
and support Communist China·ts position d~ring the Geneva 
Conference, (3) to encourage Communist China's guarantees 
ot peaceful intentions through the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence (Panche Sila). 27 These principles 
proclaimed: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-inter-
-
terence in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and 
.. tual benefit, (5) peaceful co-existence. 
The Prime Minister of Ceylon had to keep in mind the 
1trong influence the large Tamil and Indian segments of his 
pOpulation had on his gove~ent, and it would appear that 
he had difficulties w1thin his cabinet on this issue. 
1-ediately following Nehru's decision, the Ceylon government 
26Brissenden, .2.E.• ~., P• 221. 
27Ibid., p. 228. 
d a communique stating that, 111ue 
Ceylon would not be able to participate in the 
on.ference which had been proposed to be held 
;egarding S~TO, and the authorities concerned 
}la.Ve been informed accordingly. Ceylon, however, 
is prep~~d to maintain an open mind on the 
subject. 
With a common border, Burma was one of the most 
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exposed of China's neighbors and there were compelling 
reasons for this small state to be much concerned with her 
relations with China. Like Thailand, she too had a serious 
iDternal problem with alien Chinese and dissident tribal 
border groups. Soon after independence in 1948, she was 
taoed with the Karen uprising, followed a short time later 
bJ an open Communist rebellion, with extensive breakdowns 
ot law and order in large areas of the country. 
Like Ceylon, a similar conflict of opinion seemed 
to exist between Burma's U Nu and Nehru. While there had 
been a history of conflicts on many issues between the 
Columbo Powers, U Nu was usually found on the side of 
India. However, at the !Columbo meeting U Nu revealed 
lliaaelf as an independent and did not agree with the 
•xpressed Indian view that most rears or Commun.1st eneroach-
.. nt were greatly exaggerated. He reminded Nehru that Burma 
lived too close to Communist China to regard underestimating 
the Communist threat as harmless. 29 That the Burmese too 
2a · · 
Brissenden, .Q.E• .£..!!., p. 223. 
Bi-i 29Ceylon Daily News, Columbo, 8 May 1954, quoted by 
ssenden, .2.E.• .£1€1., p. 222. 
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disappointed in the f'ailure of' the Rangoon meeting to 
,..re 
•ake place, there could be no doubt. Although there were 
e·nt official denials that Burma was willing to join trequ 
SJlfO, privately, 
aanY high Burmese officials expressed their belief' 
that SEATO. was a good thing and might serve as a 
rotector of Burma's independence, even though ~he Bur.mesa government could not join it f'or f'ear 
ot antagonizing Communist China.30 
earma has never shown any hostility toward SEATO. While 
abs could not join for political considerations, she has, 
in tact, derived some com.fort from Thailand's strong 
aeabership in the organization and welcomed Thai assurances 
'1lat SEATO would aid Burma against China if called upon.31 
Indonesia, like India, was openly antagonistic 
•ovards such an alliance and, like India, re~used to con .. 
sider open debate on the sabject. At the time the invitation 
•o the conference was received, the th.en Prime Minister, 
Dr. Sastroamidjojo, enjoyed the support of the Indonesian 
0011111unist Par~y in Parliament, so his opposition to the 
!reaty was not surprising. During a visit to India after 
the Manila conference, he declared bef'ore the Indian 
Parliament that the "peace in our part of the world cannot 
be assured by military pacts such as the recently concluded 
( 30wii1iam c. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Policy 
Cl.lllbridge: Harvard University. Press, i963), .p. 101. 
31
rb· 1 ~., p. 10 • 
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t 1132 President Sukarno. a strong proponent of Jlallil& pac • . , 
~ Columbo principle, felt very adamant that the Columbo 
S should stay unified in purpose. He said that "the ?over 
J&l'dstick is whether any action of ours in the field of 
foreign affairs can be reconciled with out national 
pterests and with the spirit of Panche Sila."33 
Here again, the presence of a large Chinese 
aiDority created some influence in the Indonesian Parliament. 
It was only after the signing ·.of the Treaty on Citizenship 
with Chou En Lai, the Chinese Foreign Minister at Bandung, 
'118.t their thorny Chinese problem was settled. This did 
llUOh to strengthen Indonesia 1 s ties with Communist China. 
£t the earlier Bagiuo Conference, Indonesia had made some 
atrong statements against joining any blocs !'or external 
aecurity. The chief Indonesian delegate stated, 
It is to our interest and that of our neighbors 
that we refuse to take sides with this or that 
nation or group of nations, that we keep open 
the political, economic, and cultural t .raffic 
lanes of the Indi~p and Pacific Oceans that cut 
across Indonesia.J4 
loon after the signing of the Manila Treaty, Secretary of 
State Dulles .remarked during a visit to Indonesia that he 
appreciated that Indonesia did not believe it needed the 
32Royal Institute of International Ar.fairs, .Q.2• _cit., p. 99. 
))Fifield, . .22• ~., p. 160. 
34Ibid., p. 166. 
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tection or SEA.TO and stressed that the organization was 
pro . . 
onlJ tor those who felt the need or it. Nor did he place 
anJ relationship between the granting or foreign aid with 
one•s membership in any mutual security pact with the 
35 1faited States. Judging from recent events in Malayasia, 
with Sukarno's determined policy of "conrrontation," 
. . 
Indonesia 1 s presence in SEA.TO might have been a dangerous 
liability. 
35Ibid., p. 161. 
-
IV 
THE OVERSEAS CHINESE AND SUBVERSION 
The problem of political subversion of governments, 
1dth or without violence, has been a very important defense 
ensideration during the past twenty years. In Southeast 
Aaia in general and more especially Thailand, Burma, and 
'1le Malay archipelago, this has become particularily acute 
bJ the presence of a large unassimilated mass of the Over• 
••• Chinese, alien to the areas in which they reside, and 
loJ&l in most cases to the Chinese homeland, regardless of 
'1le political regime in power in China at the time. This 
has been a centuries old problem in Southeast Asia and has 
alva1s caused serious concern on the part of the local 
10Ternments. 
Whether this concern merits the label of "the Chinese 
Problem" has been subject to debate for many years. Prior 
\o the Communist victory in China in. 1949, there had been 
little evidence of Chinese ambition to create a political 
dominance in Southeast Asia, o.r even to unify Chinese 
ainorities into a Chinese political party. To the contrary, 
OTer the year·s in which the national government was weak 
the1 had maintained an attitude of aloofness and indifference 
'
0 Political involvement. That this attitude persisted for 
IUch a long period, implied . a deliberate Chinese withdrawal 
the national political life within the states of 
tr,,. 
aoutheast Asia. Exclusiveness and political isolation 
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did 
oontain some danger, and programs in education and legisla-
•ion to help assimilate these Chinese were undertaken by 
ao•t governments. British Imperial policy, however, was 
eentent, in many cases, to let these ethnic groupings remain 
&I a check and counterbalance to the indigenous political 
parties. But, it would be very much in error to suggest 
that the Chinese had completely isolated themselves !'rom 
the political fabric of the country. Those who thought 
that their examplary political propriety would continue 
.. re soon disillusioned soon after the triumph of the 
COllllUDist Revolution in China. As early as 1949 the Chinese 
CCllllllUDist regime began making strong political overtures to 
"1aese Overseas Chinese and in January of 1950, the !! Kung 
!!2, a Shanghai newspaper, had this warning to make regard-
lag the brethren in Southeast Asia: 
Now that the People's Republic of China has been 
established and diplomatic relations have been opened 
between the Cent.ral People• s Government and a number 
or other countries, the more than 10,000,000 Overseas 
Chinese shall and must not be subjected to further 
abuse. 
!he article went on to say that in accordance with Article 
S8 ot the Common Programme of the Central People's Govern• 
.. nt, every effort would be made to protect the legitimate 
Pigb.ts and interests of Chinese .residing abroad. These 
"&rnings from Peking began to take on a more threatening 
the new Communist regime became more and more 
teJl9 as 
1 t1J'lll1 entrenched. Few people have underestimated the 
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effect of the Overseas Chinese in this part of the world, 
•iac• tbeY have been a strategic, economically powerful 
atnority whose importance has been even more enhanced by 
'118 kith and kin ties with the Communist homeland and the 
CJ)dnese propensity for family loyalty. 2 The non•assimila-
•ion of minorities within a country does not in itself 
oonstitute a threat to security, but the concentration of 
eoonomic power and poll tic al influence within a minority 
oan be a real threat. During residence in Thailand, the 
eiter quickly learned that most Thais maintained a dual 
attitude toward their Chinese neighbors. They were happy 
•o maintain and foster the cultural exclusiveness of the 
Chinese but deplored this same exclusiveness in the economic 
and political sphere. The same attitude has been reflected 
in government policy. 
With the disappearance or 'Western colonial rule in 
Southeast Asia following World War II, the growing importance 
ot the Chinese in replacing the European in the economies of 
'1le new states has had wide repercussions. The Chinese 
111.grations to Southeast Asia over the centuries have been for 
1 . . 
(Lo d • Victor Purcell, !!12 Chinese in Southeast Asia 
non. Oxford University Press, l~l), p. 693. 
2 -ID G. William Skinner, Chinese Society 1B Thailand: I9'~alytical Historx (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
, p. v. -
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· obJ"ective It is only within the last century • 
.. economic • , 
following the expansion of Western colonial influence, that 
'118 yolwne of Overseas immigrants reached large and alarm-
1118 proportions.3 As early as the seventeenth century, 
aaropean docwnents have mentioned the presence of several 
'1iousands of Chinese in the old Siamese capital of Ayuthia. 
JNring the period of the Tribute missions to China under the 
Jling Dynasty, mention is made of the return of Chinese 
pottery makers to Siam at the request of King Ramkamb.aeng of 
Sukhothai in 1300. Even before this, there is evidence in 
'11• ruins of the old Khmer civilization at Ankor Wat that 
Oldnese fishermen and merchants occupied large stretches of 
'he Gulf of Siam. Most of the migrations to Southeast Asia 
haTe originated from the southern Chinese coastal cities in 
Pukien, Kwangtung, and Hainan Island. Population pressures, 
rather than Chinese policy, prompted these emigrations to 
the more abundant lands to the south. Before the nineteenth 
oentury, such movements were officially illegal and pro-
la1bited by the Imperial Government of China, but with 
eontrol almost non•existent and easily manipulated through 
•orruption, the traffic flowed unimpeded into Southeast Asia. 
!otal Chinese population figures vary, but most authorities 
1 
3Richard J. Coughlin, Double Identity, ~ Chinese in 
liciern Thailand (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 66), p. vii. 
on approximately 15 per cent to 20 per cent in the 
agree 
countries of Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China.4 )Order 
The control maintained on the economic city life 
bJ the Chinese in these regions has i'requently been 
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c1eaonstrated. As early as 1910, Chinese strikes and riots 
111 the city of Bangkok, in protest against a general head 
tax, completely stopped all trade and essential markets for 
ll&DJ days. The Thais realized for the first time the 
strength of the Chinese economic grip on the country and 
tme abl. li ty of this minority to paralyze the life of the 
Kingdom. Thus the dislike and fear earlier felt by the 
aovernment now found support in popular sentiment.5 
Another irritant and concern of the governments of 
Southeast Asia was the proliferation of Chinese secret 
societies. While such organizations as the Triad and Yee 
Bong societies operated many beneficial programs which 
covered such diverse interests as language schools, 
1-dgration aid committees, burial assistance, etc., their 
activities frequently assumed political significance and 
lent clandestine support to indigenous political groups 
Within the country. But their inter-society rivalry sometimes 
led to serious outbreaks of street fighting and lawlessness. 
Ge 41. Dudley Stamp, Asia: A Regional and Economic 
- ograph:t: (London: Methuenand-Company, .1962), p. 512. 
5Skinner, .Q.E.• .£l:..i., p. 160. 
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The strongest pattern of Chinese influence in the 
Or these countries has been their control over nearly 11te 
all aspects of economic activity. This phenomena of Chinese 
bU&iness energy and acumen is prevalent throughout this 
eutire region, and is very obvious in such cities as Bangkok, 
Singapore, Saigon, and Djakarta. This economic p.roblem is 
the most outstanding to the new nations of Southeast Asia. 
Bttorts to curb Chinese control have led to strong immigration 
laws and occupational restriction.a. 6 Exclusive Chinese work 
itoppages and strikes have had crippling effects in Malaya, 
fbailand, and Vietnam where Chinese labor organizations have 
been strong. 7 
Throughout their history, the people of China have, 
perhaps to a unique degree, felt themselves culturally 
1uperior to these southern races and their view of the 
native populations of Southeast Asia has been, for the most 
part, disdainful. This contempt has naturally bred bitter 
reaction among the iocal native citizens. 8 The Chinese have 
&110 organized strict family and dialect associations, and 
6Kenneth P. Landon, The Chinese in Thailand (New York 
and London: Oxford University Press, 1'941.,.-;-p. 205. · 
7 
0 Rob~rt s. Elegant, The Dragon Seed. Peking and ~ 
-"•l'seal! Chinese (New York: . St. Marti'iil'S"""Press, 1959T'; p. 9. 
8 ( Lea E. Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism 
Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), P• 15. 
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1'Usiness societies, but because of their minority status, 
'1J8Se hB.Ve confined political expression to their organiza-
tion officials. These heads have been recognized by the 
D&tional governments as quasi-official spokesmen for the 
Chinese elements in the area and are treated by them with 
oonsiderable protocol. And these contacts can likewise act 
&I channels between the local government and Peking. 
Traditionally, all Chinese governments have adhered 
to the ~oncept of dual citizenship for their nationals 
oTerseas. This, in effect, has induced the Chinese to 
aaintain th~ir loyalty to China. 9 Their importance in 
Cllinese nationalist movements is of ever increasing interest, 
particularly while the Chinese overseas increase in substance 
and affluence. Since the turn of the century, they have 
had a strong hand in most revolutionary movements in China, 
and in the case of Dr. Sun Yatsen, prepared both the organ-
ization of revolution and provided the financial support 
almost entirely. The question of dual nationality became an 
illportant issue du~ing the Bandung Conference in 1955, and 
on this occasion Premier Chou En-lai agreed to Indonesian 
4emanda that this dual privilege be eliminated. Thereafter, 
•Tery Chinese in Indonesia had to make a declaration of 
nationality. There was hidden in this offer to the other 
oountries pres~nt that proper recognition of the People's 
9 .. . . 
King, .Q.E.• .2.!!•i p. 71. 
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M~ent of China was a prerequisite to the solution of 
11.0yer~ ..... 
• - 10 
'11!B nationality problem. 
The continuous struggle which has been going on 
1949 between the Peking and Taiwan governments for 91JlC8 
eupport of the Overseas Chinese, represents an extension of 
'118 long Chinese civil war, concluded on the mainland, but 
oontinuing in the Straits of Formosa, and has taken the 
torm of a propaganda war. Both these governments have 
f.llplored their nationals to be "good citizens" of the 
ountries in which they dwell, yet neither has ever fully 
a•cepted complete severance of ties with the homeland. Not 
to be outdone by the Nationalists1 the Chinese People's 
Republic has launched an ambitious Overseas Chinese program, 
incorporated in the Constitution. Article 98 states: 11 The 
P•oples Republic <:J: China shall protect the acquired rights 
and interests of the Overseas Chinese. 1111 Within the Conunu-
aists Party's Central Committee, three organizations from 
the central government take responsibility .for these interests. 
!he first is the Commission for Overseas Work, the .function 
ot which is to plan and direct propaganda among the Overseas 
Chinese; the second is the Third Office of the Bureau of 
Vllited Front Work which has the responsibility for organizing 
<>Tersea~e Chinese participation in the "democratic movement"; 
10 . ~ Philip w. Thayer (ed.), Nationalism and Pro~ess 
?re! Asia (Baltimore: The Johns .Hopkins Press, 196), P• 147. 
ll ' ' . . Oxi' A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia {London: 0~d University Press, 1960), P• 182. --- -----
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third is the Social Department of the Chinese Communist 
... -
raJ"tJ's Central Committee. which has a general intelligence 
aa'11ering mission. In addition to these. a coillillission of 
O'fel'seas Chinese A:rfairs has been established in Peking under 
'118 Government Administration Council with the same rank as 
a ministry. This organization was set up to organize re-
"11'Dees for study and indoctrination in Communist China. as 
.. ii as to foster the purchase of government bonds by the 
()'lerseas Chinese as a means of increasing remittances. 
VealthJ Chinese overseas have been wooed and flattered into 
npport of the Co1?1'1unist regime. often making red carpet 
.tsits to the mainland as state guests of the government. 
these overseas organizations have been taking an increasing-
lJ active interest in the Chinese af'fairs of Southeast 
Aaia. The propaganda programs are extensive. Despite appeals 
\o the Overseas Chinese for loyalty to the countries in 
which they reside, Ho Hsiang-n1ing, ·Chairman of the Overseas 
Ohinese Affairs Commission in Peking. has urged them to 
•Telop closer ties with the homeland and stated that 
"nobody can sever the bond which ties the Chinese residents 
abroad to the fatherland. Mainland China is the homeland 
ot all Chinese." 12 
In devel~ping these close.r ties. the Chinese Commu-
lliata have undertaken a wide dissemination of popular 
12B~nett • ..22• .£.!.:!!•• P• 189. 
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ture and dialect broadcasts, and have made attempt~ 
11tera 
l ant teaching in the Overseas Chinese schools. They •o s 
established large scholarship progrB.Ills for study in )1aT8 
ahina and finance students liberally for this. This type 
of political and idealogical sponsorship bas increased 
rapidly during the past eight years, and in turn has in-
oreased the concern of the governments involved in these 
o•ertures. That the People's Republic of China has seen 
tit to utilize these Overseas Chinese for their own subver-
aiT• political ends, has become a serious problem and a 
.. nace to the integrity of these small nations. In order 
••remove the irritating effects of Chinese dual national-
it7, the Chinese Communists have taken steps to meet the 
ill41vidual government's suggestions. During a visit of 
Chou En-lai to India in 1954, Prime Minister Nehru 
reminded Chou or the apprehension caused by the presence 
ot a large Chinese population with dual nationality. In 
hia speech to the National People's Congress on September 23, 
19.$4, he referred to this subject: 
For our part, we are willing to urge the over• 
seas Chinese to respect the law or the government 
and the social customs or all the countries in 
which they live. It is worth pointing out that 
~he question of nationality of the Overseas Chinese 
t
s one which the reactionary governments of China in 
he past never tried to solve. This placed the 
loverseas Chinese in a difficult situation and often ed to discord between China and the countries 
concerned. To improve this situation we are prepared 
settle this question and are ready to settle it ~~rst with the Southeast Asian countries !1{ich have 
established diplomatic relations with us. 3 
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The policy of the People's Republic of China toward 
)191' neighboring Asian states, has derived strong influence 
,,oa previous Chinese hegemony in the area. The Chinese 
OGlll"mist regime stands in direct succession to an old 
Japerial Chinese tradition 'Which consistently held that 
O)dna, by virtue o.f its superior civilization, was entitled 
'9 take a preeminent position among her neighbors. 14 This 
pelicy was interrupted for the long period between 1840 
aa4 1919 by the rise of European colonial influence. Mao 
fae•tung spoke in 1936 o.f his vision "to lead the Chinese 
revolution to its completion and also exert far-reaching 
llltluence on the revolution in the East as well as in the 
wllole world. ,,l5 
The essence o.f this old Imperial system prior to 
1840 was the existence of a satellite belt, 'Whereby China 
wa1 1urrounded by subservient "client" states••Korea, 
Iaclo-China, Siam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Tibet, Nepal, 
lala1a, and even parts of Indonesia. China's actual rela-
\ionship with these "tribute" states varied f'rom place to 
Jlace, but always to~k the f~rm of a .formal tax obligation 
Pe BS. 13Royal Institute of International Affairs, .2.E• ~., 
111,."'b 14navid P. Mozingo, "China's Relations with her Asian ~ors," Current History . {September, 1964), 156. 
15rbid .. . 
--.-•• P• 157. 
to china, usually in the form or elaborate gifts. These 
contributions were meant to emphasize China's 
token 
Jdnence and power over her neighbors. Today, her pse•• 
13 
taterest in these states as buffers to what she considers 
predatory colonial systems, is a paramount consideration 
et bel' .:roreign policy. While China has not made excessive 
owertures for :friendly relations with the non-Communist 
••ates of Southeast Asia, she has made no attempt to con• 
... 1 her strong interest in ultimately realizing their 
rewolutionary conversion to the Communist ideology, and 
Jaa8 actively encouraged.Asian Communist parties to follow 
'tile path of the Chinese peoples" in seizing power. 16 
Aside from political interest in the areas, there 
Jaaa been the more important economic considerations as well. 
&a the People's Republic or China transforms gradually :from 
an agrarian to an industrial economy, so will her demand 
mac! need for these vast raw mate.rial supplies become more 
acute. The population explosion in present day China has 
laeen a serious concern to her leaders and the world in 
&eneral. The rich resources or Southeast Asia offer abundant 
IW.pplies of food, industrial raw materials, and fuel. These 
wo.ld appear to be the logical answer to China's problem. 
lhlraa and Thailand rate as the leading producers and 
\it 16Liu Shao-Chi, "Inaugural Address to the Asian-Aus~ 
la ~ian Trade Union Con!'erence," November 23, 1949, quoted 
-l.lr:r'ent Historz, September 1964. 
eJ.'Porters of rice in the world. Southeast Asia accounts 
t 90 per cent of the world's supply of natural tor a]JlloS 
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,.t>ber• Indonesia, Malayasia, and Thailand together con-
tribute to world trade about 60 per cent of its tin. Other 
pr!Jl&r1 products in less commanding positions, such as 
,.trolemn, tea, copra, palm oil, hemp and hardwoods are very 
plentitul. Likewise the strategic location of Southeast 
&ala, with its good inland waterways, and excellent 
]larbora, have made it a target of both Chinese and Japanese 
~er the years. China's control of the East-West sea lane.s 
Jaer• -could deprive both India and Japan of important 
eoenomic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia. It 
would also endanger Oceania and the still free countries 
111 the western rim of the Indian Ocean. They could 
interrupt traff'ic from the Persian and Aden Gulfs, as 
.. 11 as the Ports of East Af'rica.17 While the United 
tates has been represented as the sole deterrent to 
Ohineae ambitions in this direction, there is no doubt that 
India's similar interest in this region has already created 
&heated rivalry with China, bota ideological and commercial. 
The use of' subversive techniques in attaining internal 
JIOlitical control of countries since World War II has been 
att .. pted frequently by the Communist leadership, both 
. 17 ... 
to William Henderson (ed.), "The Communist Challenge !k~outheast Asia.," Southeast Asia: . Problems of United 
---~"""'"'-=8 ,tolicy (Cam.bridge: The~ _ Press, 19631"; p. 134. 
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i t and Chinese. So• • 
This danger to Southeast Asia was, 
d very real and became an issue of prime consideration !Jl4•• ' 
the proponents of the Manila Treaty. Subversion was 
_.,zig . 
-A.at like the illusive ghost and made the problem of 
·-.,....,_ 
oo12Dteracting it very complex and difficult. Its forms have 
be•D hard to identify and isolate since subversive activi-
, 181 otten border on the legal procedures of normal 
goTermnent process, but the aims are directed to the over• 
'11?'oW of the established political order, often in the name 
ot treedom or liberty. The usual forms of attempted sub-
Tersion are the armed insurrections witnessed in the 
Philippines, Malaya, and South Vietnam, or the more 
reatrained combinations of general strikes and riots as in 
lillgapore and prewar Shanghai. The methods the Communists 
haTe employed in the direction of subversion have varied 
from country to country, depending a great deal upon the 
political maturity of the people. Known methods have been 
to exploit small internal dissensions, arouse racial 
111.norities when they exist to revolt against "suppression" 
Ind to foment civil strife with the use of indigenous 
C11mnm1st party members or anyone dissatisfied with the 
•tatus quo. There are many who believe that it is almost 
iapoasible to . cope with this menace.18 In stating the case 
18sEA.To REPORT, "The Second Year," Bangkok, 1957. 
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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary 
,.tore 
et state Dulles had this to say in 1954: 
To .go on now to the question of subversion, 
as I pointed out, we deal with that in this treaty 
aore specifically than we have with any other 
treaty. We recognize the danger more clearly. I 
JllUSt admit that the mere fact of recognizing the 
danger does not mean that we automatically have 
tound a way to meet the danger. Subversion in that 
area is a very difficult thing to control. It is 
virulent, it is well organized, it is efficiently 
prosecuted by trained persons, and the task of 
meeting that threat will tax our resources and 
ingenuity to the utmost • • • This threat is most 
acute at the moment in .Vietnam, but I understand 
there are threats of the same character to Laos, 
Cambodia, Thailand and Malaya, and Born!Q and 
Indonesia are not free from the danger. ~ 
Singapore serves as a good case study in subversive 
'9.otics. This former Crown Colony, the activities of which 
are almost entirely COI!JID.ercial, is a city of extremes in 
.. alth and poverty. Despite it being a Malayan city 
.. ographically, the population is more than 80 per cent 
Gldneae, one-half of whom are under twenty-one years of 
age. This mass of youth has been fired by the great 
IROceas of the Chinese revolution. Many programs of travel 
Ind student exchange have taken place between Singapore and 
tile People's Republic of China, at which time the Chinese 
Ce11aun1sts have been active in organizing party cadres, labor 
111l1on cells, and Chinese school indoctrination. Their tools 
laaTe been the usual methods of terror, threats, bribery, 
~ . 
lel ti John Foster Dulles, Hearing Before ~ Senate For;ign ilnf J>ta! Committee, November. 11, 1954 (Washington: Govern. 
Printing Office, 1954), P• 14. 
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i•il disobedience, and effective manipulation of the 
C)liDese population against civil authority. Police reacti0n 
,
0 
OoJDJlunist tactics in many cases appeared to feed the 
fire I• In referring to the Malayan government's effort to 
eoabat rebellion, Victor Purcell states, 
fbe great danger for the Government was that it 
might allow itself to be led into repressive 
action against sect'ions of the population which, 
willingly or unwillingly, were assisting the 
communists, and this would arouse enmity against 
itseu.20 
Thailand too has faced a formidable menace or 
intiltration. Announcement or the formation or a "Thai 
Autonomous Peoples Government" in south Yunnan Pr0vince was 
ll&de by the Peking Government in January, 1953. It stated 
that this was a Chinese administrative arrangement to give 
oultural autonomy to the ethnic Thais of southern China. 
However, it soon became evident that this plan was being 
u1ed in the north for the purpose or indoctrinating Thai 
foutb.s in Yunnan for the organization of Communist cells 
ill northern Thailand. Quick action and exposure or these 
activities by the Thai Government at Bangkok did much to 
•inimize the effectiveness or the program.21 
The task or countering subversion is, by its nature, 
\he responsibility or the respective governments, but certain 
2 . 0Purcell, .21?• ~., p. 293. 
21 King, .2.12• .2,!1., P• 192. 
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pot1ers decided that there was real need tor coordination 
ot counter-subversive activities in the various countries 
ot this region. This cooperation could provide a clearing 
)louse tor intelligence reports and set up programs in 
... eloping counter-subversion techniques. This was an aim 
t the Manila Treaty powers. 
v 
PRELUDE TO THE MANILA. TREA.TY 
The rapidly deteriorating position of the French 
forces in Indo-China created an atmosphere of grave concern 
tor the security of the states contiguous to this area. 
Despite disclaimers to the contrary, the events in the late 
aontbs of 1953 and early 1954 led to a gradual change of 
the official United States position on the matter. The 
' fiet Minh forces in Indo-China, with increased aid from the 
Chinese Communists, were very methodically disrupting French 
plans for ultimate victory and resistance was steadily 
crumbling. Under the circumstances, the United States took 
the initiative in sounding out its Western allies and the 
interested nations of Asia on the advisibility of a col-
lective defense treaty. During the sanguinary progress at 
Dien Bien Phu, the United States ann0unced that the imposi-
tion on Southeast Asia of the political systems of China or 
Russia, by whateve.r means, would constitute a grave threat 
and would not be passively accepted. 'Since talks with he.r 
allies had already been in progress when these views were 
expressed, it is obvious that a tacit understanding had 
&l.l'eady been reached with the Western partners and the 
Preliminaries for full scale talks with the Asian members 
were already underway. A flurry of diplomatic activity at 
this time, which included visits to the United States by 
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Sil' Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden, as well 
.. talks in London and Paris by Secretary Dulles, indicated 
'1:J,at substantive decisions were being made regarding this 
t o the Far East. In April, 1954 the British and '1'.lreat 
United states governments issued a joint communique which 
aaid in part that the events in Indo-China, 
• • not only threatened those now directly 
involved, but also endanger the peace and security 
of the entire area of Southeast Asia and the Western 
Pacific, where our two nations, and other friendly 
and allied nations have vital interests. According-
ly, we are ready to take part, w:it h the other coun-
tries principally concerned, in an examination of 
the possibility of establishing a collective 
defense, within the framework of the Charter of the 
United Nations, to assure the peace, security, and1 
.freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. 
There is no question but that the Indo-China c~isis 
in 1954 served as a springboard for the Manila Treaty, and 
Ul.e joint communique quoted above was an immediate prelude 
'° such a treaty conference.2 Coming at the time of the 
acheduled Geneva conference, the British Government was 
anxious that no action should be taken which might prejudice 
'1le negotiations taking place there on the Indo-China 
'1lestion. Since Britain had long recognized the People's 
lepublic of China, she found herself in an awkward position 
!'egarding her posture at the Geneva conference, as well as 
1 Joint Communique·, CMD.9282, lli,9;., p. 2. 
2 Royal Institute of International Affairs, .21?..!. £.ti?.., p. 3. 
ill her negotiations with her Western allies covering a 
i ty pact in Asia aimed against Chinese threat of 18cur 
· n Her unenviable position was strongly sup-aggressio • 
ported by the French who, facing a debacle at Dien Bien 
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lhDi were hard pressed by the French electorate to conclude 
some arrangement ending the Indo-China war. The long drain 
on her manpower and treasure had reached the breaking point, 
aDd the French Premier, Pierre Mend~s-France pledged his 
political ~ire ~ and the life of his government on a 
scheduled conclusion of a treaty to end the French 
participation in this war. At this point, the United 
States could ge,t no more than a declaration from the 
P.rench that they would be willing to examine the possibility 
ot establishing a defense pact. Actually, Secretary of 
l tate Dulles strongly belfeved and pressed his conviction 
'1lat entering immediately into some kind or formal arrange-
.. nt with the Asian nations and the Western allies would 
illnensely strengthen the French hand at the Geneva round 
\able. The rall of Dien Bien Phu and the hopelessness of 
'1le French position quickly persuaded the British and 
'ranch to associate themselves with a formal declaration of 
intent to participate in a conference to conclude a col-
lective defense pact for Southeast Asia. With no 
IU&l'antees seriously binding the parties to a Geneva 
aci-eement, such a pact now was considered to be a necessity 
'
0 deter the victorious Viet-Minh and Chinese Communists 
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frO'/A breach of faith in the Geneva talks regardless of the 
t the conference. e11tcome o 
It had been Bri tain 1.s intention to withhold any 
aotion ~ntil obtaining the full support of the Columbo 
f01fers··India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia. 
foreign Minister Eden, continuing his constant contact with 
'1:18 Asian members of the Commonweal th during the conf'erence, 
gave his opinion that th.ere would never be any real 
iecurity in Sou;theast Asia without the good will of the free 
uian oountries.3 Nor did he think any organization could 
'9 etfective without the understanding and support of the 
Columbo Powers. In this regard and at Eden's insistence, 
Ule British arranged a meeting of the Collllllbo Powers for 
'1ae purpose of hearing their views in regard to such a treaty. 
!here was such strenuous resistance on the part· of India and 
I Indonesia, that the meeting actually never took place.~ 
Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, found 
themselves in close accord with the concern of the United 
States regarding Southeast Asian security. But, in 
patient regard for the awkward position of the British, 
'he Australians did not openly criticize British caution. 
lovever, Australian leade.rs did remember the earlier 
p. 5. 3Royal Institute of International Affairs, .2.I?• ~., 
4 Brissenden, .2.E.• £.!!., p. 221. 
tentions of H. V. Evatt in 1947 when, as Minister of 
•OD 
Jx'•rDal Affairs, he gave a detailed postwar policy 
,..,teaent regarding Southeast Asia. He said Australian 
1101 should include the ''development of a system of po . 
.. gional security in cooperation with the United States 
04 other nations." 
5 He predicted that as the people of 
1outheast Asia acquired independence and ceased to be 
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ependent upon the decisions of European governments, the·o 
weuld Australia's interests in the councils of A.sia in-
oreaae proportionately. During this period of hectic 
eTents leading up to the Manila Treaty, Australia's 
ca1e1 used his substantial inf'luence among the Asian 
.. abers of the Columbo group to moderate their views, but 
h no purpose. In the interim, A.ustralian public opinion 
'9oame fearful of the Indo...China collapse and pressed for 
10• security arrangement. The Sydney Morning Herald had 
'1lia to say: 
For America and Britain, the defense of Southeast 
Asia may be seen as strategically desirable; for 
Prance it is a matter of national prestige; but for 
Australia it is life and death. If the cork is 
torced out of the bottle, in Mr. Eisenhower's 
graphic phrase, and aggressive communism floods 
over the peninsula into Indo-China, Australia will 
be placed in immediate and deadly peril. The 6 security of Southeast Asia is Australia's security. 
a 5Leice~ter Webb, "Australia and SEATO I H SEA.TO Six -~es, George Modelski . (ed.) (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 
' p. 51. . - . . . 
6 
.!bid., p. 61. 
now just a matter of time and the fall of Dien Bien It 1ff.1 . _ 
!Jiil until active arrangements were made for a discussion of 
t 1 During a speech in the House of Commons in • '1'•• • 
lalJ• Sir Winston Churchill explained that it was the hope 
et the British government that if an acceptable settlement 
et the war in Indo•China were to be negotiated at Geneva, 
.-an• might be found for getting countries which partici-
pated in the negotiations to underwrite the settlement • 
.. )loped that other countries with interest in the area 
111.gbt subscribe to such a guarantee. It was this view 
'11at he and Foreign Secretary Eden advanced to the American 
aoTel'Dlllent and the proposal was one of several being 
eDllined by a joint Anglo-American committee. i'his group 
wa1 also studying the question of Southeast Asia defense, 
fer, as the Prime Minister stated, it was necessary to 
flan •not only for the contingency of a negotiated settle-
-t, but for other eventualities less agreeable."7 He 
.. nt on to say that arrangements for collective defense 
ill Asia would proceed whether or not any agreement was 
reached at Geneva though their nature would depend on the 
reaul.ts or the coni'erence. 
Armistice agreements which ended the Indo•China 
laeatilities were signed on July 20, 1954 at the Geneva 
,. 4.. 
7Royal Institute of International Affairs, .QJ?• ~., 
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oeJd'•l'ence. Finding themselves differing with the Commu• 
rs over the terms of a reciprocal guarantee of 1111t powe 
'111• settlement, the United States and British governments 
.. cided to underwrite and guarantee the terms of the 
1,.eva settlement by a defense treaty. While the Columbo 
?overs did not take any part in the Geneva meeting, they 
414 express their satisfaction with the results of the 
i .. eva eonference and gave strong support to the a.gDee-
... t •• 
With events moving swiftly, the United States, after 
eonsultation with the other interested powers, arranged for 
a oonterence to take place at Manila, which was to convene 
on September 6, 1954. Thus, it remained for the first 
effective regional organization in Southeast Asia to come 
-'out as the result of Western, rather than Eastern 
initiative. The eight nations which participated in the 
oonterence were Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
l'Jtance, Great Britain, the .Philippines, and the United 
ktes. In his opening address, Dulles declared that the 
United St~tes felt "a sens·.e of co~on destiny" with all the 
•euntries of the area and all were united by a common danger 
arising from "international communism and its insatiable 
labition."8 He further hoped that the embodiments and 
. 8 .. 
New !Qt!5 Times, September 6, 1954. 
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ture of such a pact would leave the way open for the 
,wuc 
9'):19r nations of Southeast Asia to eventually participate. 
1a•t prior to the opening of this eon.ference, Vice Presi-
4_.t Carlos Garcia of the Philippines and Secretary of 
a-.te Dulles took part in a meeting of the Philippine-
taited States Council set up under the United States• 
ftdlippine treaty of 1951. At this meeting Dulles stated 
•in the most emphatic terms, that in the event o.r any 
attack on the Philippines the United States would honor 
.r.llJ its commitments under that treaty and would act 
tmaediately."9 Similar sentiments were expressed by the 
other national leaders during the opening statements, but 
rald.atan emphasized her concern for aggression. from any 
1earce, besides that o.r Communism, and hoped that the 
re1Ulting pact would cope with such threats. After these 
eponing statements were made, the con.ferenee went into 
oloaed session until the treaty was written. While the 
United States viewed the pact only as a bulwark against 
COlllllUDism, it agreed to omit the term "communist" threat 
ill the text o.r the treaty but reserved the right to .further 
4etine the speci.fic United States view on this subject as 
a ••Pl.l'ate "understanding of the United States."10 
9 . 
New ~ Herald Tribune, September 5, 1954. 
10 
P 8 Royal Institute of International Affairs, .2.1?.• .£.U•, • • 
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TbB work of the treaty conference took only two 
discounting the previous consultations in w·ashing-
4&Jl1 
Manila, and other capitols of the interested powers, 
"'81 
and the Manila Treaty was signed on September 8, 1954. At 
'1ae conclusion of the Manila Conference, Presi4ent Magsaysay 
et the Philippines stated: 
Through the Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter, 
we give assurance to our sister nations in Southeast 
Asia that we do not seek to defend colonialism in 
Asia but rather to liquidate it as speedily as 
possible by methods or free consent. 
Given these two assurances, the other free 
states of Asia can find nothing objectiona~le to 
the Manila Treaty and the Pacific Charter. 
!his treaty, as a long-range defense structure, supported 
and welded by mutual economic and political understandings, 
wa1 indeed an exceptional accomplishment when one considers 
Ula diverse backgrounds and interests of the parties to 
'1le agreement. 
11 ' SEA.TO: 1954•1964, Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
'1on, Bangkok, .February 1965, P• 8. 
VI 
ANALYSIS OF THE TREA..TY AND SEATO 
The signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
treat1-~generally known as the Manila Treaty••marked the 
i.eginning of an intimate association of Eastern and Western 
powers concerned in the common defense of a vast Asian and 
Pacific region. In addition to the Treaty proper, the work 
t the conference resulted in the signing of three second• 
arJ documents, related to but not essential to the purpose 
ot the Treaty. They were entitled the "Understanding of 
. . 
the United States," the "Protocol," and the ''Paci.fie 
1 Charter." These will be discussed briefly before an 
anal1sis o.f the Treaty is undertaken. 
The special "Understanding of the United States" 
vaa insisted upon by Secretary of .State Dulles and it 
.. rel1 defined the special interest of the United States 
in Communist aggression. But in . the event o.f other ag-
aression or armed attack, it was prepared to consult under 
the provisions of the Treaty. This definition was made to 
Placate many Congressm~n who .fe~ed that American .military 
Power might become involved in local political or 
\U&Si•colonial disputes. 
1
see Appendix C for text of the Manila Treaty. 
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The "Protocol'' to the Treaty designated the states 
ot Ca.IDbodia, Laos, and the .free territory of Vietnam as 
eligible for benefits under Article III and IV of the 
These states were unable to participate as full 
as a result of the Geneva Agreement. 
·-bers 
The "Pacific Charter" was included at the suggestion 
of President Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines in order to 
aak8 clear to the signatories that right of self determina" 
tion of peoples would be guarded and "colonialism" in any 
torm would not be promoted. 
The Treaty itself suggests a "Monroe Doctrine" concept 
et protection but implies much less of a commitment than 
that declared in the North Atlantic Treaty where "an attack 
on one equals an attack on all." Dulles is reported to have 
4eliberately planned this to avoid issues of constitutional 
law when the treaty came up for ratification in the 
nate.? But President Eisenhower rs official commen.ts on 
the signing of the Treaty were not nearly so specific in 
t.tining ''aggre-ss·io~." He stated, "The Treaty is designed 
to promot~ security a~d peace in Southeast Asia and the 
louthwestern Pacific by deterring Communist and other ag-
ll'ession in that area. • • n3 The Treaty provided in part 
~l 2Ralph Briabanti, International Implication~ E1_ ~ 
tfo .! ta~ (New York: American Institute of Pacific Rela-
ns, 9~7), p. 18. 
'1-eaid 3United States Congress, Senate, Message of the 
ent, ~ Southeast !.!!.!.! Collective Defense Treat3 ~ 
duplication of some commitments which had been 
tor a 
d by the United States and the Philippines under 
a111JJ11e 
'1Util' Treaty of 1951, and also, the oblig.ations assumed 
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,
1 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States under the 
&JZUS Treaty. While the main theme of the Treaty related 
'°military collective defense, there was also incorporated 
ill the pact some provisions for trade, economic assistance, 
pct cultural exchange programs. 
Looked at from a broad perspective, the Manila Treaty 
.. bodied two essential military and political .features 
which should be emphasized before a more thorough study and 
examination of the provisions of the Treaty are made. 
lirst, the agreements were a means of putting on a permanent 
-.Sis the staff consultations that had beeD held between 
acme members as a result of bilateral defense arrangements. 
!he Treaty served as a permanent .framework .for the continua-
'1.on of these military contacts on a regular basis and 
defined which threats to mutual security would arouse 
organized military response by the signatory powers. The 
military provisions offered protection to the small non•sig• 
... tory countries in the area which might request such aid, 
1114 might otherwise be defenseless against threat of 
l,ggl'ession. The second broad feature of the Treaty was the 
b .!J'otocol Thereto, Executive K, The White House, i9~~Dl)ber 10, 1954 . (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
..... ' p. 2. 
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it ·cal arrangement for aligning the nations or Southeast pol 1 
'ormally on the side of the United States on matters Asia .a. 
-1111111on interest in the area. 
ot Ov--
In his message, President Eisenhower also emphasized 
.'1af.t the "Treaty calls for economic cooperation to enable 
~ tree countries of this area to gain strength and vigor 
ot only militarily, but also socially and economically." 
!he main body of the Treaty, however, relates to the 
ailitary security aspects of the Treaty area and these 
are very clearly defined. 
The Preamble of the Treaty set forth the spirit 
and purpose of the Treaty. It recognized the sovereign 
equality of all the parties and reiterated their faith in 
'118 Charter of the United Nations and defined the legality 
ot this Treaty under Article 51 of that charter which 
permits individual and collective de.fense. This Treaty, 
it stated, was directed against no government, no nations 
Uld against no peoples. 
Article I reiterated the resolve of all the parties 
to rea.t'firm their solemn obligations under the Charter of 
the United Nations to settle by peaceful means any inter• 
a&tional disputes in which they may be involved, and to 
~•train in their international relations from the threat or 
llle or force inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
lations. ii 
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Article II contained the principle of the earlier 
faJ!denberg resolution, which required that collective 
iecuritY pacts entered into by the United States must be 
..,,ed on continuous self-help and mutual aid. The parties 
pJ.edged themselves by such means not only to maintain and 
•eveloP their individual and collective capacity to resist 
armed attack but also to prevent and counter subversive 
aotivities directed from without. The Treaty thus 
eaph•sized the danger of subversion and indirect aggression.4 
Article III declared that sound economies and tree 
!aatitutions were essential in maintaining internal peace 
Uld security. It recognized that Communism breeds on 
poverty, and that nations might be able to develop their 
internal stability through economic cooperation. Secretary 
Dalles pointed out that this article created no economic 
walls against nations in the region which did not partici• 
pate in the Treaty but did offer a special relationship 
\o the member states. Nor did Article III preclude United 
tates• aid to non-member nations when their economic 
1trength and stability contributed to the stability of the 
area.5 
4· .. . 
Ibid., p. 3. 
let SU~ited States 
- ense Treatl, p. 4. 
Senate, The Southeast Asia Collective 
-
The collective security objectives of the Treaty 
two-fold. One is implied in the Protocol to the 
.. I'. 
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This made it possible for the designated Protocol 
,,ates to appeal for assistance in case of violation of 
tbe Geneva Agreement and would thus help to stabilize the 
area as a whole. Another i 's f'ound in Article IV which was 
deiigned to avert acts of aggression or subversion. This 
article, described by Dulles as the most important of the 
!reaty, contained three sections.6 Section I defined 
.. aaures to be taken against overt aggression and provided 
tor certain non-signatory states to be included in the pro• 
'9ct1on of the Treaty, under specific conditions. Section 
II described the obligations of member states pursuant to 
Ule measures to be taken against s~bversion, while Section 
III described the duties of member states in assisting the 
4eaignated states in ease of aggression. 
The non-signatory states referred to in Section I 
were Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Associate member-
lbip was broached for these "Protocol" states by the 
••bers, particularly the United States, which regarded the 
••aae fire in Indo-China as a major Connnunist achievement 
Uld recognation of certain Communist control in Southeast 
6Ibid .. 
-· 
7 The neutralization of Laos and Cambodia had been Asia• 
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f the Geneva Agreement. Many Americans feared that part o 
t)lis might embolden those who hoped to bring these states 
911der ruture Communist influence and control and thus con-
i•i "1te a threat to the Treaty area. Since the Manila 
treatJ: resulted mainly f .rom the crisis in Indo-China, the 
ieeurity of these states was of great importance to 
Southeast Asia. 
To facilitate implementation of the Treaty, Article 
y provided for a Council of the member nations. This 
oom::ac!l would provide for consultation regarding military 
ua4 other planning as the situation in the area might 
re,uire. It was this article that gave authority for the 
permanent Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. 
Article VI reminded the parties of ' their obligations 
•o the United Nations Charter. Each member declared that 
it vas party to no international arrangements in conflict 
with the United Nations and that it would not in the 
hture undertake such arrangements. 
Article VII made it clear that not all nations which 
••re interested in the Treaty or might benefit from it were 
able to become members, and this provision would make it 
0
••ible for them to accede to membership at some future 
(Lo d 7 J • H. Brimmell, Commun.ism in South East Asia 
11 on: Oxford University . Press,l9S9), . p:-2'1:J4~ 
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This would require, however, the unanimous consent 
et the members. 
Article VIII described the "Treaty area" as the 
ral area of Southeast Asia, including the entire 
.... 
territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of 
Uae SouthWest Pacific not including the Pacific area north 
ot twenty-one degrees thirty minutes north latitude. 
Article IX merely assigned the Republic of the 
Pldlippines as the official depositary of the Treaty while 
A:rticle X and XI covered technical aspects of the duration 
et the Treaty, procedures for withdrawal Qf membership, 
aa4 agreement on the language of the Treaty texts. The 
!J'eat1 was to continue indefinitely. 
It is significamt that the Treaty commitments of 
'1le United States included defense of part of the mainland 
et Southeast Asia, since the United States has been tradi• 
tionally shy of military involvement in this area. It 
•• also the first time that Australia and New Zealand had 
P&l'ticipated in treaty arrangements in Southeast Asia, 
Ut•ide of previous empire commitments. New Guinea, Timor, 
ladonesia, and Burma belonged to the Treaty area. Though 
.. t being members, their .governments ~ight nevertheless re-
, ... t protection which would be accorded if the signatory 
lleabers agreed. The Treaty could be applied in the case of 
louth Vietnam, C~bodla, and Laos only "at the invitation 
., tri th the consent or th.a government cone erned.." 8 
The wording or the commitments against external 
a•taok in Article 'IV differed from that of the North At-
iaatic Treaty both in purpose and spfrit. Rather than 
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•• •attack on one is an attack on all" concept, this 
.a.r•icle stated more moderately that "aggression by means 
et armed attack in the Treaty area against any or the 
parties ••• endangers its own peace and safety," and 
each government would "act to meet tlile common danger in 
aecordance with its co~s~itutional proeesses."9 Article 
If likewise stated that the parties to the Treaty must 
eon111lt together to devise methods against subversion, 
111dl• consultation prior to action against external attack 
•• not required al 1lli.@ugh coordinated·efforts were implied. 
Interpretation of this Article IV led to long debate 
t.ring the Congressional hearings on ratification of the 
!reat7. Hamilton Fish, as president of the American 
Pelitical· Action Committee, pleaded that the real danger 
t 'this provision was that the United States government 
Oould now make war without a declaration or war, and might 
feel duty bound to react in a military way to any Chinese 
91' other Communist provocation. He did not feel that 
A.!'ticle IV, as presented, could definitely avoid dual 
Coll . 8Department of State, Bulletin, "The Southeast Asia 
1954,)ctive Defense . Treaty," Vol • . XXI, No. 795, 20 (September 
' Art. IV, Se et. 3. . . 
9 Ibid., Art. IV, Sect. 1. 
10 
illterpre ta ti on• The rather loose interpretation that 
ld be given to this section of the Treaty was made 0011 
eYident in 1962 during the crisis in Laos. Eager to 
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reassure its ally, the United States declared that any 
aotioD in meeting an armed attack by Communist forces did 
•not depend upon prior agreement ot all parties to the 
!l'eatf, since this treaty obligation is individual as 
.. 11 
well as collective. 
And again in Dullest report to the Senate, men• 
•toned above, he stated that no material Changes in military 
planning were required since we were "maintaining at all 
'illes power.ful naval and air forces in the Western Pacific 
eapable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places 
ot our choosing. '112 This too could suggest independent 
interpretations of ,act.ion in non-member states rather than 
eonsultations and collective determinations as required by 
the Treaty. Action against subversion and overt military 
attack, when carried out simultaneously, could render 
Article IV•s provisions against subversion somewhat ambiguous. 
10 . United States Congress, Senate, Hearing Before 
hCllllllittee on Foreign Relations, The Southeast ~ Collective 
Ji:tens! Treaty, January 19, 195~ashington: Government 
inting. Office, 1955), p. 43. 
b 11nepartment of State Bulletin, Vol. 46, "Statement 
rl Dean Rusk and Thanat Khoman," HO 11671 ('Washington: 
OTernnient Printing Office, 1962), P• 498. 
l2u -
cOllai nited States Congress, Senate, Hearing Before 
ttee on Foreign Relations, ~· ~., p. 6. 
1. 
' 
I 
I 
, I 
no action should be taken against attack or sub-
S1D08 
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i on on a non•member state except at the invitation of yer• 
'1Jl.t state, the Treaty powers might face a difficult 
problem. As a result of a successful coup d'etat, the 
].egallY constituted state would no longer exist and no 
!DYitation for intervention could legally evolve. This 
oould be a real dilemma under the Treaty and would have to 
be anticipated in an area where the coup d'etat is not 
iJltrequently employed. These risks of possible misinter-
pretation did exist but it was decided that the danger of 
th:!a could hardly be worse than inaction. Dulles had 
declared earlier that collective action might .have risks, 
·~t these risks are far less than would face us in a few 
13 
rears from now if we dare not be resolute today." 
The Council, established under provision of Article 
V of the Treaty, was granted only broad general outlines of 
&•thority. In fact, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SIA.TO) itself became an organization as a result of Council 
aotion and was not inherently provided for in the Treaty. 
'1'he Bangkok Conference, held in the Thai capital F~bruary 
23·25, 1955, involved an epochal development in American 
foreign policy with respect to Southeast Asia. It not only 
llarked the first meeting of the Council created by the 
York: 
13Norman A,. Graebner, An Uncertain Tradition (New 
McGraw-Hill, 1961), p.-Z-95. 
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!;reaty, but also 
to iJllplement the 
The SEATO 
founded the structtll'e for SEA.,TO which was 
. 14 
spirit and provisions of the Manila Treaty. 
Council which consists of the Foreign 
Ministers of the eight member countries and meets annually, 
iets the broad~, , common policies required for the fulfillment 
ot the objectives of the Treaty. Each Foreign Minister 
represents his country and each has an equal voice in the 
proceedings. All decisions are unanimous.15 The Bangkok 
conterence first set up a Permanent Council of Representa-
tives which was to meet at .SEA.TO Headquarters, at least 
once a month. The selection of Bangkok as the permanent 
headquarters of SEATO was a very logical choice. Although 
both Singapore and Manila put up strong arguments in favor 
ot these two sites, emphasizing the excellent technical 
facilities and communications systems already available, 
both were rejected for sensitive political reasons. 
Singapore, being a Crown Colony, and representing a system 
repugnant to most of the newly independent states of Asia, 
OOuld not be seriously considered. Likewise, Manila was 
11 . 
14nep~~tment of State, The Bangkok Conference of the 
~ Powers, Publication 5909';-Ser. II, Far Eastern~ ---
lV&iliington: Government Printing Office, August 1955), P• 1. 
1 l5orrice of Public Information, SEATO REPORT, 1954-lli9 (Bangkok: Southeast .Asia Treaty Organization Hea<r-q~ers, 1959), P• 14. . 
ill 
~egarded as too much on the periphery of the area and 
1 too closely oriented with the United States to possib 1 
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otter a good neutral background for the participating powers. 
!h&iland, however, was part of the Asian land mass, and 
]l.eadquarters in Bangkok would reflect the faith of its plan• 
ners in the permanence of the area. With the SEATO Military 
headquarters in close proximity to the areas of' possible 
comnunist aggression, such presence might act as a deter• 
rent to any rash action on the part of' Communist China, and 
would serve as a political stabilizing influence within 
!hailand as well. 16 
In addition to this Permanent Council, a Military 
.lclvisory Group was formed, compmsed of a military member 
each from the signatory states, for the purpose of making 
reco:rmnendations G>n military matters to the Council and to 
paraue the implementation of recommendations approved by 
'he Permanent Council. This group established a planning 
office in Bangkok for training facilities in Thailand and 
'1utoughout the Treaty area. A Secretariat....Qeneral was 
established to support and coordinate the non-military 
work of the organization. Its head, the Secretary-General, 
vaa to be the chief permanent official 0f SEATO and the 
lpokesman for the organization. Other committees and 
lh_ . . 
~Modelski, 22• .£.!1., P• 107. 
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t ions were created to ca:rry out the special purposes of ••0 
-· Manila Treaty. ~e Central Service Office was to deal 
1fith ad.Dlinistrative and financial matters pertaining to 
'118 organization. The Cultural Relations Office was 
eJPeoted to encourage the strengthening of the members• 
eultural heritage through use of grants, exchange scholar-
aldps, and traveling lectureships. The Economic Services 
ottice was given the broad function of collecting informa-
'1on on current economic development and problems, and 
eoonomic activities of the Communist bl0c, especially in 
'1ae !reaty a:rea.17 On the basis of the information gathered 
bJ the Office's own resea:rch and other sources, studies were 
'° be prepared on the specific economic questions for the 
oonsideration of a Committee of Economic Experts and the 
Oouncil representatives. Another .function was to make 
periodic reports on actions in the economic field taken by 
Ule member governments to ca:rry out recommendations of the 
llA.!O Council. 
The program for economic cooperation and the improve• 
.. nt of social conditions was provided for in Article III 
ot the Treaty. Here, technical assistance was specifically 
.. Dtioned in pro~oting economic progress which would con-
'1-ibute to internal and collective efforts of governments. 
l7SEA.TO REPORT, 1954 .. 1959, .!m• ill•1 P• 19. 
I 
II, 
11 
I 
fl1e pacific Charter also affirmed the intention ot the 
11gnatories to ''continue to cooperate in the economic, 
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iocial and cultural field in order to promote higher living 
itandards, economic progress and social well being in the 
region.'' Although it was not clear at the time the Treaty 
aad Charter were signed whether it was intended to imple-
.. nt these proposals through an organization created 
.,ecitically for this purpose under the Treaty, or whether 
agencies already existing in the area would be used, this 
,uestion was explored at the Bangkok Conference and resolved 
accordingly. Rather than set up administration of foreign 
aid which might duplicate efforts and programs already 
.. derway, it was decided that existing arrangements for aid 
lhould continue and that additional aid under the Manila 
treaty should be confined to compensation for military aid 
and other expenditures incurred in connection with the 
treaty itself. Programs already in existence referred to 
the vast bilateral aid programs supported by the United 
l'ates, the Columbo Plan, United Nations agencies such as 
mJAFE, and the World Baruc. 
The foreign aid planning of the United States had 
kllpt in mind the danger of economic under•development and 
the accompanying stress which might invite Communist schemes 
tor retorm. There was no certainty that a country would 
•ot tuiwn to Communism even though, possibly with Western 
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1 it was making good progress in raising living stan-)18 p, 
cla!'dS· But there was a real danger that a country which 
found itself frustrated in its social and economic aims would 
t;ar'!l to Communism in despair. The chances that a country 
would be encouraged to preserve a system of social and 
political freedom were certainly much better if it were 
1J1proving and raising the standard of living of its 
oitizens. Where living ~tandards were not raised, unrest 
and agitation could quickly invite change. The measure of 
economic improvement was entirely relative. In Southeast 
Aiia, where economies were based largely on agriculture, 
the scope and cost of a program to render improvement was 
mach less than that for a country of similar size in Europe 
which had advanced to a greater degree of industrialization. 
!he encouragement of land reform schemes, improved methods 
et cultivation, increased access to markets through better 
~ansportation systems, irrigation projects, canals, road 
~uilding, and electrification of rural areas, would greatly 
increase living standards. The American foreign.aid pro-
grams began as early as 1942 in the Latin American countries, 
lnit the first ambitious effort followed President Truman's 
Inaugural appeal to make the ben~fits of scientific advances 
llld industrial progress available for the improvement and 
ll'ovth or under-developed areas. From a modest beginning 
ot 35 million dollars in 1950, the American foreign aid 
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"""'ams to Southeast Asia exceeded 8 billion dollars by proo-
1958. Under pressure or the Korean and Indo-China wars, 
'11• essentially economic objectives of foreign aid gave 
1 to assistance related more closely to political and 
,,. 18 
ailitarY requirements. The stated purpose of the Mutual 
aeourity Act of 1951 was to 
• •• maintain the security and to promote the 
toreign policy of the United States by author-
izing military, economic, and technical assistance 
to triendly countries and to strengthen the 
national security and indiiidual and collective 
defense of the free world. 9 
!he original good intentions or purely economic assistance 
was perforce altered to meet the military threats during 
tihis period. By January of 1954, Sec.retary or State Dulles 
)&ad to admit that foreign aid was being limite~ to situa• 
'ions where it clearly contributed to military strength, 
11pecially in Vietnam. There was some early hesitation on 
\he part of.'the United Kingdom to accept this diversion to 
llilitary aid since British emphasis at the first Bangkok 
Conterence was on the economic rather than military objec-
'ives ot the Treaty. British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony 
Iden hoped it . would ". • • promote economic well-being and 
18.Amos A. ~Jordan, ''U. s. Foreign Assistance in 
:OUtheast Asia," in William Henderson (ed.), Problems of 
-· ~. Polic;y:; (Cambridge: The. M.I.T. Press, .,1963), P• 213. 
19 .. 
King, .fU?• £ii•~ p. 156: 
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••yelopment • • • We should all know by now that a .f'ree 
IJlcl prosperous people is Communism 1 s most formidable f'oe. "20 
ID answer to the question on the purpose of aid to Southeast 
A•ia, the Clay Committee replied that if this assistance 
itrengthened the will and capacity of' a country to remain 
independent and helped it move toward political and economic 
atability, our money would have been wisely spent. 21 The 
1J1lited States' bilateral assistance under the Manila Treaty 
1ft.I undertaken with this purpose in mind in most instances. 
BJ doing so, it helped these regions achieve an impn>vement 
1D both economic and political posture. 
Other aspects of foreign aid took more specific 
forms. The securing of' bases for military purposes of' SEA.TO 
4etense required large capital outlays which were beneficial 
to the countries involved. In some cases, offers of aid 
were extended to preclude orfers of aid from Communist 
1oarces. The Russian and Chinese Communist governments 
lla.Te always been disturbed by this successful venture into 
4eTelopment of the nations or Southeast Asia, and they have 
•ollght to picture ulterior motives behind Western moves. 
!he1 usually described such foreign aid as a scheme to 
!li., 
20nepartment of State, !h2 Bangkok Conference,__g;e. 
p. 25. 
21 
Jordan' .2.E.• m.' p. 214. 
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resume the old colo.nial positions in Southeast Asia. A 
t1Pical charge was that: 
American businessmen and politicians, placing 
little reliance on doctrines and theories, pre-
ferred to conduct their shady business with the 
coun.tries in the name of their allies and under 
the auspices of international organization. This 
happened in South Vietna..~ when the U.S.A. 'imper-
ceptibly' supplanted France.22 
1x:penditures in good will, communications, medicine, 
education, and cultural exchanges, likewise required heavy 
capital outlays. The use of funds in precluaive purchasing 
to deny strategic materials to the Communist bloc entailed 
large hidden expenditures. These were all economic measures 
pertinent to American implementation of Article III of the 
!reaty. But they were small measures in comparison to 
the overall military assistance given in support of 
indigenous armed forces. In a.valuating the potential 
economic benefit of some of these so-called military 
expenditures, it can be seen that many projects had dual 
Talue. The same roads construct~d for the military in the 
north of Thailand could also be used for hauling teak or 
•olt:ram to the port of Bangkok for export. The new vast 
telecommunication systems served both the military and 
oivilian needs, even though the cost was charged as a 
llilitary expense. Too, the establishment of military air 
bases throughout the Treaty area has created a · fine net-work 
ln .. 22-Y. · Konovalov, "The Tentacles of Bases Strategy," 
....,ternational Ai'fairs, Vol. 7 (Moscow: July 1963). p. 56. 
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Ornmercial air-strips which can be used concurrently. at c 
leW military power stations have a capacity and permanency 
to meet civil requirements of large areas for years to 
oome.23 
Implementation of the economic provisions of the 
freaty were an important task of the first meeting of the 
council at Bangkok, but the creation of the military organ 
to maintain the collective defense of the Treaty area was 
a much more complicated undertaking. The military commit-
aents of the Treaty were carefully spelled out. It was 
tally agreed, for example, that in the event of an attempted 
Communist conquest of Thailand, the members would be com• 
llitted to fight and must be willing and able to fight. The 
aethod of meeting such an attempted conquest would depend 
on its nature, the area of attack, and the type of terrain 
involved in the immediate theater of the attack. Consequent-
17, the type of threats possible in the Treaty area should 
be examined before analyzing the military provisions of the 
!reaty. 
By its geographical nature and configuration, the 
ll'ea did not lend itself to the deployment of mass armies. 24 
SEAT 23i'Pa~tners in Progress," SEATO REPORT (Bangkok: 
0 Headquarters, 1962), p. 7. 
24 p. 158• Royal Institute of International Affairs, .Q.E.• ~., 
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r oads, heavy jungle, monsoon weather cycles, and an f oor 
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alJlost purely agrarian economic base for supply, contributed 
little to the support of modern land forces. The logistic 
requirements per man in the modern Western army was many 
tiJJleS that of the Communist Asian counterpart, as was re-
yealed in World War II and the Korean War. From a political 
point of view, the traditional dislike of foreign garrisons 
ill Asian countrysides, the inevitable incidents between 
ailitary and local citizens, the differences in the 
political and social philosophies of the membe.r nations, 
all made the question of permanent foreign garrisons 
impractical. 
Because of the long distances involved .from the 
Asian mainland to the Philippines or Australia and the vast 
amount of material necessary, it could be assumed that an 
crtert attack would not take the form of an amphibious 
operation, although submarine and mine warfare was a limited 
possibility. Chances of air attacks were more to be reckoned 
with, but these would hardly assume dangerous proportions 
11Dless they came as a prelude to invasion. The remaining 
'JP• of attack would take the form of either a mass land 
invasion or concerted guerilla operations. Among member 
nations, only Pakistan had a common border with 1China and 
this was 200 miles of mountain barrier. An attack against 
!ha.iland or East Pakistan would perforce violate the 
I 
: 
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trality of Burma and India, and any other theater of ueu . 
aggression would have to be directed against Laos, Cambodia, 
and south Vietnam. The decision not to maintain large 
perJD8.Ilent garrisons in static posture in the treaty area 
•as first set forth by Secretary Dulles at the Bangkok 
Council meeting in 1955.25 Instead, the main strength would 
rest with mobile strategic forces of great sea and air 
power which could strike swiftly wherever the need arose. 
!his massive retaliation force would be able to utilize 
most of the United States strategic bases from the Aleutians 
to the Philippines. In addition to this heavy mobile force, 
each partner would be expected to supply ground forces, and 
the United Kingdom and the United States would make the 
aajor naval contributions. Among Western forces would be 
the nearly 45,000 .Americans based at Okinawa, and the 28th 
Commonwealth Brigade plus the supporting air units available 
1n Malaya.26 Air power would contain groups from the Asian 
aambers as well. Mobility and massive striking power was 
to be the basis for all defense doctrine. Arthur H. Dean, 
the former special Ambassador to Korea , in 1953•1954, 
declared, 
25The Bangkok Conference, .Q.E.• ~., P• 5. 
26 ' . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Bl The Institute for Strategic Studiesf !h2 Communist 
.....22 .!n2 the Western Alliances (London, 1963J, .p. 22. 
We ought not to scatter our power into show pieces 
of ineffective size by establishing substantial 
stationary United States forces in forward areas, 
since our military establishment is relatively 
small compared with the extent of the territory 
to be protected.27 
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Specific commitments to the SEATO military establish-
.,nt by the member states was to be determined by the 
nature of their forces, and their geographical proximity 
to threatened areas. This applied as well to air and naval 
torces permanently assigned to SEATO :f"unction. These SEATO 
obligations became a great part of the u. s. Seventh Fleet's 
training and service activities. Great Britain was main-
taining a substantial Asiatic force, spread from her 
1trategic commitments in the Middle East to Hong Kong. 
Australian air and sea participation was also substantial. 
The SEATO garrison in Thailand was to be manned by local 
troops. The bulk of the massive retaliation striking force 
rested with the United States. There were also Military 
.lasistance Advisory Groups and supporting troops stationed 
throughout the Treaty area, but the main American combat 
llllits remained in the Korean, Hawaiian, and Okinawan areas, 
outside of thos~ employed in South Vietnam. The 13th Air 
Poree, stationed in the Philippines at Clark Field bad .full 
IWeep or Southeast Asia and was within easy striking 
4a " . 27.A;thur H. Dean, "Collective Defense in Southeast 
ia, Current Historx, Vol. 31, No. 179, July 1956, p. 8. 
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clistanoe.28 Under the Security Section of SEATO, a train• 
iJ1S program to combat subversion was set up, using 
ailitarY and constabulary forces of the member nations. 
SEATO joint planning and training programs, both 
ailitary and civil, were an active and essential part of 
tb8 organization from the start. Member nations, especially 
Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand all experienced a 
lhortage of skilled workers in the industries and shops 
that were to ' supp·ort the organization. The outcome was the 
SBATO Skilled Labour Project which suppleme~ted the efforts 
ot the governments of these countries to increase their 
1upply of trained manpower. Besides various technical 
1chools established in the Treaty areas, a SEATO Graduate 
School of Engineering at Bangkok provided a two~year course 
or advanced instruction leading to a master's degree in 
1tructural, hydraulic, transportation or public health 
engineering.29 A SEA.TO Military Technical Training School 
in Bangkok provided a three-year training course for the 
future technical supervisors, foremen, skilled workmen and 
instructors of the Royal Thai Army, Navy, and Air Forces. 
Meteorological teleconnnunieations projects were also set up 
28James E. King, "Collective Defense: The Military ~ODlllitment," in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy in the 
-
0ld War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins .. Press, 190S9), p. -1'29.-:-
. 29SEATO: 1954•196k, .22• £.!j?,., P• 9. 
:lD !bailand and the Philippines, as well as medical 
e· arch laboratories. res 
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The military training programs began soon after the 
tounding of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. As 
earlJ as 1956, SEATO undertook its first joint military 
aoeuver named "Operation Firm Link" in which all members 
participate~ in .a mock airborne operation against a simu-
lated attack in northern Thailand.30 The operation employed 
••e ot amphibious, paratroop, air, naval, and ground forces. 
!bis exercise was the first ot a long series of joint 
problems of this type to be conducted regularly throughout 
the Treaty region since its inception. The tirst maneuver 
va1 ta:r from a real success, but it did serve to emphasize 
the weaknesses inherent in any operation of this type, 
eaploying multi-lingual elements with diverse training 
backgrounds. Standardization of procedures would be very 
necessary.31 The areas used for these exercises changed 
regularly to better acquaint the SEA.TO members with their 
Tarioua theaters of operation. Operation "Saddle Up" 
invaded North Borneo and this was followed by exercise 
•hlungan'' carried out by amphibious :forces against a 
1956
) . JOSEATO Record, Vo~. 1 (Bangkok: SEA.TO Headquarters, 
, p. 8. ' 
31
"seato, '' Deadline Data on World Affairs, August-
llll'ch 1962, p. 3. - -
~ 
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l')dlippine shore. Of these many practice maneuvers carried 
out each year, a specific type of military operation was 
attempted, to acquaint these forces with operations they 
Jligbt encounter in case of a military aggression in the 
Operation ''Tulungan," held in 1962, employed !19eat1 area. 
. . 
4oo aircraft, 78 naval ships, and 37,000 men. The planning 
and study involved in. such 0perations required close team 
work and coordination and this was made possible through the 
Jlilitary Planning Office of the Organization. In a recent 
report on SEATO, the Secretary-General, Pote Sarasin, drew 
attention to the military exercises held during the past 
1ears which he said, 
developed from relatively simple demonstrations of 
coordinated movement, into highly complicated 
maneuvers lhich tax and develop skill of the 
members' armed forces in combined action.32 
!he political and military problems faced by these member 
nations were shared to some extent by non•member states as 
well and SEA.TO's success has evinced considerable interest 
'1atoughout Asia. In 1959, for example, both Burma and 
Indonesia dispatc~d observers to the SEATO military exer-
cises in Thailand. Besides military preparedness, their 
interest ~as focused, as well, on the economic and technical 
developments of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. 
32 , . 
lftL Pote Sarasin, Secretary-General, Report .2B Seato, ~2-196,J (Bangkok: SEATO Headquarters), p. 12; 
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such a complex, coordinated military structure had 
t been maintained over this vast area since World War II. no 
!hB success:Cul growth of the organization .from the early 
}lopes of the first Council meeting at Bangkok to the present 
zietlected the concern that the member powers held regarding 
possible Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.33 
3JModelski, ..QJ2• ~., p. 8. 
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VII 
CHALLENGES TO SEATO 
Before any evaluation of SEAT0 1 s usefulness can be 
attempted, there must be a review or the political and 
ailitary crises that have developed in the Treaty area 
since 1954 and the challenges that these events have posed 
, 0 the Manila Treaty powers. A·s anticipated by Secretary 
ot State Dulles, the most serious breaches of peace have 
occurred in the ''Protocol" states of Laos and South Vietnam 
which were not eligible for full membership in the Treaty 
due to the Geneva Agreement, but which Dulles hoped might 
1 be given some "mantle of protection." In the case or 
Laos, the Communist Pathet Lao have attempted a series of 
illaurgencies aimed at the overthrow or the Royal Govern-
ment. A similar rebellion in South Vietnam, led by the 
Communist Vietcong, an integral part of North Vietnam's 
Lao Dong Party has resulted in very heavy military operations 
Which could engulf the Treaty powers in a major war. Commu-
nist Chinese and Soviet . support or this rebellion has been 
quite open, as will be seen, but the Manila Treaty powers 
have had to exercise great restraint in their reactions to 
&Toid charges of ureckless interference'' in the internal 
l.ttairs of these states, despite requests from the states 
l . Q. a. Daily Wireless Bulletin, September 7, 1954. 
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When SEATO was created, China had already become 
tormallY allied with the Soviet Union in a Treaty of Friend-
tbiPi Alliance, and Mutual Assistance dated February 19$0. 
fbis Treaty joined these Communist powers against a re-
iurgence of Japanese militarism and for the purpose of 
.rurthering their mutual interests in the economic well-being 
. 2 
and peace of Asia. The Chinese Communist Party made early 
etrorts to assert its ideological independence from the 
soviet Union and this was soon made evident by China's 
participation with Communist leadership in Southeast Asia 
and its support of other Asian Communist movements. Not 
wishing to become subservient to the Soviet Union, and 
finding themselves frequently at odds with Soviet policy on 
such matters as Hungary and Albania, the Chinese have taken 
a more active independent part in the Communist movement 
1n Asia. Following the Chinese disengagement in Korea, 
heavy logistic commitments went to the extension or military 
aupport to the Vietminh in Indo-China which ultimately led 
to the political settlement of the Indo•China war at Geneva 
in 1954.3 The spread of Communism into northern Vietnam 
2 · . . . 
n-. Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in tne Far East (London: 
VA.Lord University Press, !953), p.~6~ 
Oxt 3J. H. Brimmel, Communism in Southeast~ (London: 
o:rd University Press, .1959), . p~259. · · · · · · 
I' 
e the Peoples Republic of China the opportunity to ga., 
extend its influence through the support of expanded 
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Vietminh activities in southern Vietnam and the strength-
ening of the Pathet Lao dissident forces in northern Laos. 
The political turmoil that has existed in Laos 
since World War II resulted mainly from the struggle for 
power between a few elite political factions, two of which 
were led by rival half-brothers, Prince Souphanouvong and 
Prince Souvanna Phouma. These groups had their origin in 
the strong anti-colonial movements which prevailed prior to 
World War II and they were strengthened by a period of 
semi-political autonomy during the Japanese occupation. 
The Pathet Lao, under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong, 
strongly opposed the re-establishment of French presence 
in Laos after Japan ts def'eat and turned to the Vietminh for 
support, both political and military.4 Using Thailand as 
a base (and not without sympathetic Thai support), 
Souphanouvong organized his "Resistance Government" and by 
1952 succeeded in securing p~litical control over two of 
the remote northeastern provinces of Laos bordering Tongking 
in North Vietnam. At about this time his activities in 
'l'ba.iland were curtailed by the Thai government after evidence 
was uncovered that this same group had tried to incite 
4 . 
Butwell, .21?.• ~., p. 131. 
Laotians in Thailand to agitate for an autonomous Lao 
in ~ortheast Thailand.5 During July of 1955, province 
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fighting erupted between the Communist oriented Pathet Lao 
torces and the Royal government troops in northern Laos 
despite the Geneva accord, and the presence of the Inter-
national Control Commission. At this time an attempt was 
made by Thailand to have the Manila Treaty powers formally 
declare thei.r concern over this matter, indicating both 
SEATO jurisdiction and SEATO unity. But, for the first 
time, Britain and France vetoed the resolution and suggested 
that the International Control Commission merely be noti-
tied that the situation was reviewed. The Soviet press 
made a propaganda issue of SEATO disagreements and spoke 
ot the 
deepening crisis which has beset the principal 
aggressive grouping in Southeast Asia, the 
United States' sponsored SEATO bloc. Britain 
and particularly France have .not expressed any6 desire to participate in SEATO "join" actions. 
In 1957 the Royal Laotian government arrived at a settlement 
with the Pathet Lao. The two northeast provinces were 
5nuring a talk with Prince Souphanouvong at Bangkok ~n 1951, he complained to the writer that Laotian refugees 
~~-the Udon district of northeast Thailand were being 
.u.cu-shly treated by the Thai police . and many of these 
Laotians were anxious to return to north Laos if the Royal 
gove~nment of Laos would give them safe conduct. 
VIII 611Washington's Asian Impasse,'' International Affairs, 
(Moscow, 1962), 34. 
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re-incorporated into the Laotian state, the armed forces 
of Prince Souphanouvong were assimilated into the regular 
Laotian army except for bis own elite political guards. 
While SEATO played no direct role in the settlement, it did 
.aintain contact with the Royal Laotian government. During 
the negotiations the United States, Britain, and France 
issued a tripartite note affirming their interest in the 
independence and unity of Laos. This gave the Laotian 
government the public support of the three major Western 
powers in SEATO but did not commit the organization to any 
other course. 
Efforts of the International .Control Commission to 
investigate and e:xpose violations of the Geneva Agreement 
were continuo~sly hampered by the veto power of the Polish 
commissioner against the Indian and Canadian members. Laos 
again became the focus of world attention in 1959 when 
another flare-up took place between re"grouped Pathet Lao 
and government forces. T~e · Secretary-General of SEATO im" 
J18diately declared the matter entirely a Laotian internal 
attair and that SEATO would remain outside this conflict. 
!he United Nations Security Council expressed concern over 
the Laotian situation as early as 1959. At that time, 
!ha.iland notif'ied the Council of border violations in her 
northeast provinces when fighting had erupted in that area 
facing Laos. Although Russia protested the implication that 
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~ Pathet Lao were supported by forces of North Vietnam, 
tb9 United Nations agreed to investigate the matter.7 
Speaking of this Laotian incident before the Supreme 
Soviet in October 19.59, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev stated, 
Given a reasonable approach and adherence to 
international agreements, the skirmishes which are 
taking place th.ere can be ended and the situation 
normalized. The important thing is that the Great 
Powers should not interfere in the internal affairs 
of other coungries or else there may be undesirable 
consequences. 
In late 19.59 and early 1960, the Pathet Lao, 
supported by a Soviet airlift of military supplies, re-
gained control of much of northern Laos as well as areas 
in the south bordering on. South Vietnam. The effect of 
this Soviet aid which was sent from North Vietnam was to 
pat the Pathet Lao in a position of unprecedented strength. 9 
!he Laotian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the same time 
announced that his government was considering an appeal 
to SEATO under Article IV of the Manila Treaty. The SEA.TO 
Council responded by announcing its "grave concern" over the 
continued offensive of the Pathet Lao rebels. The Council 
7nR~qu~~t of Thailand for Assistance Under the 
•
Peace Observation Connnission," Yearbook of the United 
-!tions, 19.59, p. 60. - -
·Sic. u. Chernenko (ed.), Soviet Foreign Polic:, ~aic Acts and Documents of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, ~l~f1%'2(Moscow: Foreign Language PublishingHouse,-
, p. 90. . 
~odelski, .21?• ~., P• 13. 
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rurther declared that if active military attempts to obtain 
oontrol of Laos continued, members of SEATO were prepared 
• • within the terms of the Treaty, to take whatever 
• • 
action may be appropriate in the circumstances.nlO As the 
Laos situation assumed major crisis proportions, moves for 
• cease-fire were offered to the Pathet Lao, and when they 
retused, the Royal government appealed to SEATO members to 
bring pressure to bear, the United States threatened uni-
lateral action to preserve the integrity of Laos. President 
Kennedy appealed to the American people, moved new forces 
to the Pacific and marine helicopter crews into the north-
east provinces of Thailand. With this adamant show of 
intention, the Pathet Lao called for a cease•fire in May. 
SBlTO had to decide whether to intervene in this internal 
war, and it concluded reluctantly that it had to face such 
a possibility. It declared its readiness to do so in 
guaranteeing the cease-fire in Laos. The ~eneva settlement 
ot the Laotian question in 1962 guaranteed peace and 
neutrality for Laos, but the Pathet Lao, supported by 
Vietminh, acquired still more territory during 1962-1963 
Ind have largely invalidated the position of Souvanna Phowna 
1oWi111~ Henderson (ed.), Southeast Asia: Problems 
.2' ~ited States Policx (Cambridge: The M.I~Press, 1963), '-~ o. 
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t he neutralist leader of the Geneva-sponsored coalition as 
11 
government• 
A second and more serious challenge to peace and 
stability in the Treaty area which constitutes a challenge 
to SEATO as well, has been the Communist Viet-Cong threat 
to south Vietnam. or the many countries of Asia, Vietnam 
is one of the few that can be considered basically a Sinic 
culture, and has in fact been incorporated in China proper 
during many periods of its long history. Like the Thais, 
the first Vietnamese migrated St!>Uthward from China centuries 
ago. During this period the Chinese had sought to extend 
their control and influence over these migrated brethren, 
but usually met resistance. 12 From the first Chinese 
conquest until the French in turn gained control in the 
nineteenth century, Vietnam's political relationship to 
China had been one of a cautious and anxious n.eighbor. 
Before the French era, this studied caution was determined 
largely by the strength of the Chinese government in power 
at the time. Even the late Manchu d111asty in the seventeenth 
century imposed a tribute relationship on Indo..China and as 
late as 1885 Vietnam rulers received investitur.e from Peking. 
11Ibid., P• 150. 
12liarold c. Hinton, China's Relations with Burma and 
!ietnam (New York: . Institute of Pacific RelatrO'iis), p. ~ 
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Although this direct subservience was ended with the French 
occupation, the national and political development of these 
people was strongly affected by Chinese influence. Vietaam's 
thousand year vassalage to China contributed several 
historical traditions. 
Despite the ethnic similarities, the Tongkingese in 
the northern part of Vietnam have been extremely distrustful 
ot the Chinese. This has resulted in awkward relations 
between the Communist parties of the two countries. The 
cultural sophistication and unusual discipline of the 
northern Vietnamese gave them a superior attitude in their 
dealings with the Chinese. The memory of the early Mongol 
invasions of the Thirteenth Century, followed later by 
the Ming and Manchu forces, did not make the Nationalist 
Chinese occupation of 'Tongking very pleasant after the 
surrender of the Japanese in 1945. 
Nguyen Ai Quoc, who took the name of Ho Chi Minh, 
was released from a jail in South China in 1944 at the 
urging of u. s. military authorities. They hoped that 
this known Communist leader would be able to form a core 
ot resistance to the Japanese in Tongking and could serve 
the OSS as well in developing contacts in Japanese held 
territories. In addition he was to form an indigenous 
liberatiol'l movement, similar to the Free Thai movement led 
by former Thai .Premier Pridi Panamyong. That he succeeded 
llUch beyond American expectations iB very evident today. 
I 
I 
I 
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There is an interesting parallel to this phenomenon in 
'l'bB.iland, Malaya, and the Philippines where the so-called 
"anti•fascist" forces of liberation during ·world War II 
becaille the nuclei of Communist movements in these countries 
tallowing the Japanese surrender. By August of 1945 Ho 
Cbi Minh's influence extended across most of the northern 
districts of Tongking and down to the delta provinces of 
South Vietnam. The OSS was delighted with his success and 
he was in very high favor with the first American contin-
gents in Hanoi in 1945.13 
Contrary to American wishes, the French managed to 
reestablish effective military and political control over 
the southe.rm half of Vietnam with the assistance of a 
British occupation force under General D. A. Gracey. The 
north was relieved of the Chinese Nationalist occupation 
in late 1946 and Vietnam was unified with a promise of 
independence within the French Union under ~peror Bao Dai. 
But failure of the French to carry out this promise set 
otf bitter reactions thr.·oughout the country and a guerilla 
warfare broke out in early 1947 which was to continue through 
to the present day. 
Prior to World War II, the old Indo-China Communist 
Party was an offshoot of the French Communist Party and 
·13 . ... 
~., p. 17. 
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)ll8.intained a close association with the Soviet CoDlI1lunist 
FartY as well. But under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh 
attar the Japanese War, this party became more closely 
associated, geographically and ideologically, with the 
cbinese Communist Party. Problems peculiar to Asia and 
the close similarity of the agricultural and industrial 
development of the two states made this orientation rather 
logical. In 1951 the Indo-China Communist Party was trans• 
rormed and took the title of the Vietnamese Workers Part 
or Lao Dong. In addition to Marx and Lenin, the teachings 
and theories of Mao Tse-tung were adapted for party 
direction.14 This new party aimed for international 
solidarity with the people of Cambodia, Laos, the Soviet 
Union, China, and all Peoples democracies. Ho Chi Minh 
became President and Vo Nguyen Giap its military commander. 
In structure the party took the Chinese rather than Soviet 
torm and this reorganization formally broke French CoDllllu-
nist Party controi.15 Like the Chinese Party, the Lao Dong 
provided tor a broad base of support through various .front 
organizations. 
Following the French defeat and the Geneva Agreement 
in 1954, Chinese influence and activity in the Lao Dong was 
14s~r~~d B. Fall, The Viet Minh Regime (New York: 
Institute of Pacific Relat1ons,-r9;6), .p. 36. 
15Brimmell, .2.E• ~., p. 296. 
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greatly stepped up as well as Chinese participation in the 
economic strengthening of the new Peoples Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam. The leading role played by Communist 
china during the Geneva Conference paved the way for greater 
cbinese influence in North Vietnam. In 1955 the Vietminh 
made further changes in the party structure in order to 
create a greater appeal to nationalist opinion in South 
Vietnam and to enhance the Party's respectability in Asian 
, 1es. Tl:µs resulted in separating the functions of the 
Party chief, Ho Chi Minh, and the political leadership, 
Premier Pham Van Dong. In September 1955, the third 
congress of the Lien Viet Fatherland Front declared that 
lorth Vietnamese regarded the division of Vietnam. as merely 
a temporary measure until sufficient time .and indoctrination 
prepared the south for acceptance of Communist leadership 
in a unified Vietnam.. This was to be accomplished by 
•tree" elections. 16 In the summer of 1955 Ho Chi Minh made 
an official visit to Peking and on July 7 signed a Sino-
Vietnamese communique with Chou En-lai in which they warned 
the United States and the other Treaty powers against imple-
aenting the "designated" states portions of the Manila 
Pact. The same communique announced that China would grant 
lorth Vietnam 800 million Chinese Yuan for rehabilitation 
( l6BBC Summarw of World Broadcasts, Vol. V, No. 494 1955)' 34. ' L -
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and would greatly expand the technical cooperation between 
tbe two nations. · In addition, the North Vietnamese would 
send cadres to China for training and the Chinese would 
send technical and military advisory missions to North 
17 Vietnam• 
After the appearance of a new political strong-man 
in south Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, the Lao Dong 1 s ambition to 
win over early support of nationalist sentiments in South 
Vietnam came to an end. With American support, Diem quickly 
aroused a strong political following in the south. This 
American support took the form of heavy outlays in foreign 
aid, both military and economic. He declared that the free 
elections throughout Vietnam would not take place since 
South Vietnam was not a party to the Geneva Conference. 
Such elections could not be considered free unless all 
Communist cadres were withdrawn from the north and impartial 
United Nations• observers were on hand to supervise the 
elections. These conditions were not acceptable to North 
Vietnam. Diem's effective pacification of dissident 
elements in South Vietnam, including the religious Cao Dai 
sect and the French supported Binh Xuyen party, established 
him in a strong position to- ~ounter North Vietnam influence. 
facing this new power, Ho . Chi Minh was forced to discontinue 
17Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents 
.2!! .,f1ternational Arfairs {London: The Chiswick Press, 1955), 
p. 75. 
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bis appeals for unity under the Communist leadership and 
instead established an underground apparatus called the 
VietnB.ITl Labour Youth League, a division of the Lao Dong 
18 CoJllID.unist Party. The United States' aid program in 
south Vietnam was undertaken outside of its SEATO obliga-
tions, but not in conflict with them. Other SEATO powers 
made independent contributions as well, especially Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. The massive 
United States aid program was seen not only as an effort 
to save Vietnam alone, but "to deny to the Communists the 
strategically and economically important area of Southeast 
A . ,,19 sia. · 
Internally, the Communist organization in all Vietnam 
was seriously shaken by the Sino-Soviet ideological split 
following the Hungarian uprising and the de-Stalinization 
program undertaken by Khrushchev. The uncertain situation 
in the USSR and throughout the Communist movement after 1956 
gave the Chinese an opportunity to exploit their strength 
and prestige in Asia. 2° Chinese interest in the North 
18 . -
Brimmell, .22• ~., p. 300. 
l9united States Congress, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Reeort of the Special Studz Mission to Southeast ~gat 88th ongres s--nlashington: Government 'Printing Office, 
3J, p. 12. 
20P G. Bo~d, Communist Chin.a's Forei~n Policy (New York:· Frederick .A. Praeger, 1962), .p. 9. 
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Vietnaillese became more active in late 1958. Speaking 
before the Fifth Session of the Peoples Congress in February 
1958, Chou En-lai stated, 
As one of the parties to the Geneva Agreement and a 
close neighbor of the Indo-Chinese countries, China 
is at all times concerned2!1-th the consolidation of peace in Indo-China • • • 
More evidence of this competition for Party support by both 
the Soviets and Chinese was the stepped~up Soviet participa-
tion ip Laotian affairs in late 1959. This was followed by 
substantial increases in aid to North Vietnam at the same 
22 
time. 
It has been see.n that no direct intervention by SEATO 
in this region was formally invited or undertaken, but 
I 
individual nations within SEA.TO did offer assistance in the 
form of economic aid, medical prograi~s, military advisory 
schemes, and training programs. Since 1961 means have been 
devised for associating South Vietnam in an observer status 
with meetings of the SEATO Council and othar SEA,TO bodies. 
Vietnamese officers have observed most of the SEATO mili· 
tary exercises. While falling short of full participation, 
these new arrangements have made it possible for the 
21center for International Affairs, Communis~ China ~$5•1959 Policy Documents (Cambridge: Harvard University 
ess, 1962), p. 408. · 
22 
Boyd, .Q.E.• ~., P• 54. 
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Vietna...mese army staff to make contacts with the Military 
Planning Office of SEATO at Bangkok. This has permitted 
at least some coordination of the individual foreign aid 
projects without committing SEATO collectively in the 
Vietnam war. Without full participation, the North 
Vietnamese feel conrident that ultimate victory will be 
theirs. Following an interview with Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi 
during July 1962, Barnard Fall stated: 
The feeling of the Hanoi leadership seems to be 
that a protracted revolutionary struggle in S.outh 
Vietnam would fully discredit the south by the size 
of the u • .s. commitment needed to keep it in power 
and would permit, in the.ir words, " ••• the 
marshalling of world t)ublic opinion against 
American Imperialism.23 
During the long years of fighting in South Vietnam,. 
massive evidence and intelligence has been collected on the 
origins, support, strategy, and ultimate goals of the Viet 
Cong insurrection. Much of this material collected by the 
Security Branch of SEATO and the International Control 
Commission indicates that the Communist regime in North 
Vietnam, supplied by the Communist bloc throughout the world, 
has assisted in the organization and direction of the 
insurrection in South Vietnam. Statements of North Vietnam's 
leaders, captured documents and supplies, confessions of 
23Be;nard B. Fall, ''The Road to Socialism in North 
tietnam, 11 in Doak Barnett (ed.), Communist Strategy in ~ 
New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963), P• 213. 
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captured agents, and other information secured through 
sEATO and South Vietnamese 1ntelligence channels, would 
str~ngthen this charge. The Communist leadership does not 
deny this support and frequently exhorts the Party pub-
lically to stronger action and greater discipline. For 
example, Le Duan, a member or the Politburo and First 
Secretary of the Lao Dong Party, said at the Party Congress 
held in Hanoi in September 1960, 
Parallel to the building and consolidation of 
North Vietnam, bringing:it to Socialism, our people 
should endeavor to maintain and develop the revo-
lutionary forces in South Vietnam • • .24 
Numerous speeches and statements of the North Vietnam 
government leaders could be cited to show the nature of 
their activities in South Vietnam. A few of these are cited 
to substantiate their open avowals to subversion. Writing 
in the party organ !!.2.£ Tap in April 1961, Truong Chinh, one 
of the principal leaders of the party in North Vietnam, 
referred to Hanoi as the "revolutionary base common to the 
entire country" and expressed confidence in the ability to 
remove the present government of South Vietnam. He added, 
"North Vietnam is serving as a strong base for the struggle 
for re-unification. "25 North Vietnam's Defense Minister, 
24SEATO Special Report, ~ 'Communist Plan .l,Q Conquer ~uth Vietnam (Bangkok: The Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
t on, 1962), pp. 3.4. 
25 ~., P• 4. 
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General Vo Nguyen Giap, explicitly pointed out in !!2,g. Tap 
in January 1960 that "the North has become a large rear 
ech~lon of our army • • • The North is the revolutionary 
26 
basa for the whole country." Even earlier in 1959 the 
party Congt"ess in Hanoi reaffirmed that: 
The common task of the Vietnamese revolution 
is to • • • accelerate the socialist revolution 
in North Vietnam ·while at the same time stepping 
up the democratic revolution in South Vietnam 
• • • • to maintain and develop these forces in 
the South and create a r~xourable condition for 
national re~unification. f 
A very significant document on this subject is the report 
of the International Control Commission, signed by India 
and Canada (not by Poland) and released by the British 
-
govermnent on June 25, 1962. Tt stated that: 
In -specific instances there is evidence to 
show that arm~d and unarmed personnel, arms, 
m~nitions, and other supplies have been sent 
from the zone in the North (Vietnam) to the zone 
in the South with the object of supplying, 
organizing, and carrying out hostile activities, 
including armed attacks directed against the armed 
forces and administration of the zone in the South. 
These activities are in violation of Articles 10, 
19, and 51 on cessation of hostilities in Vietnam 
• • • .2 
The use of sections of Laos as a base and inf'iltra-
tion route for the Viet Cong bas been an important factor 
1n the movement of men and supplies from No.rth to South 
Vietnam. SEA.TO Security organs have been aware ·of this 
26Ibid., P• 5. 
2a12!,g., P• i1. 
27Ibid. 
-
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sfstem for several years. In September 1961 there were 
several major engageme·nt·s involving North Vietnamese Viet 
Cons forces of 500 to 1000 men, in Kontum Province and 
near Ban Me Thuot in the central highlands facing Laos, 
as well as in Phuoc Thanh and Kien Phong along the Laos 
border further to the south. In this connection, Tchepone, 
the town in eastern Laos to which Soviet transport planes 
had been airlifting supplies in 1961, is only twenty miles 
trom the Vietnamese border. The airbase there has recently 
been expanded and Tchepone is now believed to be a major 
base of operations both for the Pathet Lao and the Viet 
Cong.29 
In 1961 the Department of State issued a special 
report entitled A Threat to the Peace. It described 
- -
Borth Vietnam's program to seize South Vietnam. The 
evidence was collected by the Republic of South Vietnam 
and presented .to the International Control Commission. A 
majority of the Commission agreed that there was sufficient 
evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that North Vietnam 
was guilty of organizing and supporting the insurrection in 
South Vietnam in specific violations of rour provisions of 
the Geneva Agreement of i954.30 
29 .. ~., p. 6. 
R 30n~partment of State, ~ession From the North, the 
-!Cor£ .2.£. North Vietnam's Campaign !.Q Con'Ci'iie'r SOUth Vietnam; 
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Very recently the Department of State issued a 
White Paper on the subject of Vietnam entitled Aggression 
From the North, ~ Record of North Vietnam's ~ampaign to 
-Conquer South Vietnam. Released in late February 1965, it 
-
was timed to coincide with the United .States' increased 
military involvement in Vietnam, particularly the airstrikes 
against North Vietnam supply and staging centers used by the 
Viet Cong. The report is a summary of the massive evidence 
of North Vietnamese aggression. The evidence has been 
jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts. 
It showed that the key leadership of the Viet Cong, the 
officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, 
the political organizers, and propagandists had come from 
the North and operated under Hanoi's direction. The train• 
ing of essential military personnel and their ·infiltration 
into the South was directed by the Military High Command 
in Hanoi.31 
The second section of this report gave evidence that 
the weapons and munitions used by the Viet Cong came from 
North Vietnam. In recent months new types of weapons have 
been introduced for which the ammunition had to come from 
outside sources, namely Communist China and Eastern European 
Communist bloc countries.32 
lo. 7839 (Washington: u. s. Government Printing Office, 1965), 
p. 2. 
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Section III of this report described the political 
apparatus used through the Lao Dong to control and direct 
operations against South Vietnam. The Fourth section ex• 
plained the military-political structures used by Hanoi 
to rurther the Viet Cong war. Each of these sections of 
the report presented a mass of documentary evidence, many 
including photographs, and the findings of the International 
Control Commission are likewise produced as evidence. Under 
the heading of military infiltration, the report cites the 
following example. Special training camps are operated in 
Xuan Mai and Thanh Hoa in North Vietnam. Trained personnel 
are then infiltrated to the South by the 70th Transport 
Group which uses trails via Laos as well as the maritime 
route along the coast. A typical case was Major Tran Quoc 
Dan, formerly with the Vietminh Army against the French, 
who, after the Geneva Agreement was sent to Hanoi to join 
the new Peoples A:rmy. In March of 1962 he received orders 
to move to South Vietnam. With six hundred men. he traveled 
through the Laos corridor and joined the First Viet Cong 
Regiment in South Vietnam. He subsequently took part in 
forty-five actions against the South Vietnam army before 
defecting.33 
Covering the logistic field, the report cites many 
cases of Czechoslovak and East German arms being captured. 
33 . !!2.!!!·' p. 21. 
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on February 16, 1965 an American helicopter pilot sighted 
a suspicious vessel offshore of Phu Yen Province. A 
Vietnamese airforce strike against the vessel sank it and 
a short time later the cargo was retrieved. It contained 
one hundred tons of assorted weapons and ammunition, 
including two thousand Mauser rifles, light machine guns, 
anti-tank 75 mm recoilless weapons of Chinese manufacture, 
one million rounds of small arms ammunition, medical sup-
plies, and other field equipment. A member of the Inter• 
national Control Commission and members of the .free press 
were present to examine the cargo and ship which had sailed 
out of Haiphong just a few days before.34 
This Department of State document along with the 
reports of the International Control Commission give con-
clusive proof that North Vietnam is guilty of aggressive 
actions against the government of South Vietnam and conse-
quently endanger the peace of the Manila Treaty area. 
SEATO intelligence reports based on the findings of the 
Organization's Security Branch confirm the reports submitted 
by the government of South Vietnam and a majority of the 
International Control Commission. On the basis of these 
diversified reports, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
is faced with a real and ppesent challenge to its purpose 
and authority in the Treaty area. 
CQiNCLUSION 
Since the United States had n.o S'on·tl:i k s:i?a'0.1. colonial 
territories under administrative cont.rol af'ter the inde• 
pendence of the Philippines, her i n terest and participation 
in the Manila Conference was made less suspect than that of 
Britain or France. The latter nations at the time continued 
as colonial powers. An essential element of American 
prewar poli cy was the Open Door in Asia, and this policy 
appears to have been important in prompting the United 
States to support the creationof SEATO. While this no 
longer took the form of special privileges or extraterri-
torial rights, American policy sought to continue free 
access to the vital raw materials of this region and 
unfettered trade through the friendly cooperation of the 
governments of Asia. American policy was prompted as well 
by the desire to contain Communism within its immediate 
bounds. The United States expressed concern in early 1946 
that the Soviet Unionts implementation of the Yalta Agree-
ment in the Manchurian ports of Dairen and Port Arthur had 
denied free and open access of these ports to other powers 
and improperly removed Chinese political authority over 
these cities. In December 1946, the writer accompanied a 
United States naval vessel to the port of Dairen which 
challenged the Soviet position and this resulted in the 
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so-called "Dairen Incident" of 1946.1 While the United 
states government responded to a Russian ultimatum to leave 
the harbor within twenty-four hours or bear full responsi-
bility for the safety of the vessel, the incident did serve 
to focus attention on Russian violations of the Yalta 
Agreement and the Open Door doctrine. 
When the formation of the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Pact was announced, the Communist and neutralist 
denunciation which followed took very similar form. The 
Warsaw Pact powers considered the presence of a military 
defense bloc in the East a threat to the balance of power, 
but their hostility did not approach that of the Chinese. 
They looked upon SEATO as a subt'erfuge to undermine the 
Communist achievements at the Geneva Conference table. 
These powers complained that the alliance was intended to 
be a cover for the return of 'Western imperialism to carry 
out further exploitation of the people of Asia and to "grab 
up the natural riches of these countries."2 
The Russians were quick to point out that Asian 
participation in the Treaty represented a small minority and 
consequently it could not be regarded as a Southeast Asian 
1New York Times, December 24, 1946. 
2 i'Declaration of the 'Warsaw Treaty States," The 
~urrent Digest Q.f, the Soviet Press, (July, 1958), .X:2o. 
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pact. The next step, according to the Soviet Union, would 
be an effort by these same Western powers to conclude an 
aggressive alliance with South Korea, Taiwan, and a 
re-militarized Japan which could eventually be merged with 
SEAT0.3 This would not only make the Western position more 
palatable to the Asian members but would provide a cheap 
source of manpower as well. Khrushchev in early 1958 pro-
tested against all these military blocs as a cause of war 
rather than a means of defense, and reminded the world that 
the Socialist camp would be willing to dismantle its alli-
ances if the West would do likewise.4 A recent article in 
Pravda criticized American retaliation against North Vietnam 
in the following terms: 
In an attempt to create at least a semblance 
of a pretext for these new acts of armed aggression 
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, u. s. 
officials could refer to the fact that in the 
course of their liberation struggle, the South 
Vietnamese patriots are dealing blows at military 
installations on the territory of the u. s. 
occupied South Vietnam. But who gave the United 
States the right to retaliate against the actions 
of guerillas in South Vietnam • • • thereby help-
ing a puppet government in South Vietnam.5 
3M. Markov, ''SEA.TO' s Future and the NEATO Project," 
_!nternational Affairs (Moscow: June,1962), · 6:61. . 
4Mik.h.ail Kremenyev, "The Non-align~d Countries and 
World Politics," World Marxist Review, Vol. VI (April, 
1963), 28. ' ' '' ' ' 
5Pravda Editorial, Soviet Documents, Vol. III, 
No. 9 (Marc~ 1965), 7. 
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The reaction of India and Indonesia was similar to 
that of the Soviet Union. The substance of their complaint 
. . . 
was that SEATO i~self was an instrument or potential aggres• 
sion dominated by the West9rn powers and was actually Western 
colonialism in a new form. 6 Nehru objected that SEATO gave 
the West a hand in Asian affairs and was not only directed 
against Communism, but against all non-member nations as 
well.7 
In studying Indonesian resistance to the SEA.TO alli• 
ance, two very important political factors must be considered. 
First, the political fabric and philosophy of the present 
day Indonesian government has been closely sympathetic with 
the Connnunist bloc and the largest supporting element of 
the Sukarno leadership has been the Indonesian Communist 
Party. SecoDd, if Indonesia had become one of the Treaty's 
signatory powers, it is unlikely that her own expansive 
geographical ambitions could have been attempted or realized. 
Sukarno had this to say as early as 1945: 
I have on one occasion in my life dreamt of a 
Pan-Indonesia, which will include not only Malaya 
and Papua (New Guinea) but all the Philippines •• • • 
6Ralph Briabanti, International Implications 2f. ~ 
laniJ:.! ~ (New York~ American Institute of Pacific . 
elations, 1957), p. 37. 
· 
7Hamilto~ Fish Armstrong, ''Thoughts Along the China 
Border," Foreign Affairs (January, . 1960), 265. 
I myself am convinced that the people of Malaya 
feel themselves as Indonesians, belonging to 
Indonesia and as one of us • • • I still say 
• • • that Indonesia will not become strong and 
secure unl~ss the whole Straits of Malacca is in 
our hands. 
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Sukarno was not inhibited in his militant approach to the 
West Irian problem nor in his recent threats to destroy 
Malaysia. His encouragement to subversive elements and his 
organized guerilla attacks against this neighbor in recent 
months are common knowledge. 
The Peoples Republic of China not only took a strong 
position against the Manila Treaty but also brought con• 
siderable pressure to bear against the small states of 
Southeast Asia to avoid their alignment with the Manila 
Treaty powers. Chou En~lai, the Foreign Minister, 
declared to the Peoples Congress in September 1954 that 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was set up to under-
mine the 1954 Geneva Agreement and to give the United 
States an opportunity to suppress national movements in the 
area. It further permitted the United States, under the 
guise of foreign aid to "strip these countries of their raw 
materials and enslave the peoples with a return to colonial 
rule. 11 9 Chou also warned ·that through the use of the 
8nThe Terri to.ry of the Indonesian State," Background 
~ Indonesia's Policy Towards Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
alayasian Government, . 1964), p~ 2o. 
9Brimmell, 2:2• ..Qi-1., P• 288. 
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"designat~d" states, United States imperialism would be 
able to extend its armed intervention and oppression to 
other parts of Asia. A returned Thai visitor to Peking in 
1957 reported after his interview with Mao Tse-tung, that 
china considered the SEA.TO structure a false wall made with 
faulty bricks, and like the Baghdad Pact, could not hold 
10 
up. 
The states which came under the protection of the 
Treaty by designation took different views. Both Cambodia 
and Laos during the late 1950s welcomed the political 
stability that SEA.TO encouraged, especially in regard to 
the peaceful handling of long smoldering border disputes. 
But late in 1962, after the Geneva settlement on Laos, 
both nations asked to be released from the "designated" 
category in order to remain entirely neutral and non-aligned 
so far as relations with Communist China were concerned. 
However, soon after the cease fire in Laos in 1962 the 
agreement had been repeatedly broken by the Communist Pathet 
Lao, and the International Control Commission stated that it 
had been impeded in carrying out its function by the opposi-
tion of the Communists. Consequently, there has been little 
lOnavid .Wilson, "China, Thailand, and the Spirit 
of Bandung," ~ ~ Corporation (July, 1962), 28. 
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progress towards national reunification. 11 
The insurgency against the government of South 
Vietnam reflects a very complicated situation containing 
strong political factors as well as military. The postwar 
policy to contain Communism had its origins in Europe. Here 
nations faced the military threat of the Red Army marching 
against the West. A line was drawn, beyond which Soviet 
power could not prevail without battle. But in the Far 
East, and especially Vietnam, the nature of the threat is 
• •1 •1•t b t l"t" 1 12 W -lr d t not pr1mar1 y mi 1 ary u po 1 ica • e(UI.. an corrup 
government in South Vietnam has been an easy target for 
Communist reaction and subversion. Despite all the 
features the world dislikes about Communism, it has adroitly 
recognized and exploited historical forces working in its 
favor, while the attractions of Western political democracy 
have not aroused any mass acceptance. 13 South Vietnam bas 
continued under SEATO protection as a designated powe.r and 
this question was the subject of heated debate during the 
recent meeting of the members at Manila in April 1964. The 
liunited States Congress, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Report of the Special S.tudy Mission to Southeast 
Asia October 1963, 88th Congress Report #893 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 15. 
12Ha.ns J. Morgenthau, "We are Deluding Ourselves in 
Vietnam," ~ X2!:1f Times Magazin~, April 18, 1965, p. 25. 
13sidney Len~, The Futile Crusade (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1964), p. 40. 
Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman sounded out the signa-
tory powers on the possibility of direct SEA.TO assistance 
in the long struggle against the Viet•Cong, should South 
Vietnam make such a request. While only France vetoed 
discussion of the proposal, and this was not unexpected in 
view of the diminished French interest in the area, some 
of the other Treaty nations have been reluctant to enter 
this situation without a clearer demonstration of political 
stability ih the south. 
A proper evaluation of SEA.T0 1 s role in Southeast 
Asia must take into account two important and continuing 
factors. The first is the militant and expansive nature 
of international Communism with its professed doctrine to 
eradicate, ultimately, all forms of non•sacialist political 
economies throughout the world. The second is the historical 
pattern of Chinese pressure for hegemony over Southeast Asia 
based on Chinese security considerations and the material 
requirements to support China's exploding population. 
These patterns have not changed. To say that China has 
always been well placed to overrun her neighbors, but has 
not been inclined to do so, fails to admit the long periods 
or Chinese suzerainty over the "tribute" states. Further-
more, the advent of European colonialism in this area with 
its techniques of modern warfare and the competitive demands 
or Imperial Japanese policy temporarily inhibited Chinese 
ambitions in Southeast Asia. 
With the removal of both Japanese and European 
colonial status in most parts of Southeast Asia following 
world War II, the focus of 'Chinese interest on the area 
resumed new vigor and purpose, especially after the victory 
of the Chinese Communist revolution in 1949. While the more 
obvious component of this interest bas been Chinese economic 
penetration, a greater concern to the people of ~sia has 
been China's aid to Communist insurgent organizations. The 1 
overseas Chinese problem has been a serious one to these 
small countries and became more so when Communist China 
decided in 1953 to provide places for thirty representatives 
of the Overseas Chinese in the National Peoples Congress in 
Peking.14 This representation emphasized the effort at 
central con.trol maintained by the Peoples Government of 
China over its brethren in Southeast Asia. These countries 
have also been alarmed by Communist China's continued 
adherence to the traditional j!!§ sanguinis doctrine which, 
in contrast to the more generally accepted Jus .!Q!!, regards 
ancestry and not birthplace as the criteria of nationality 
and furthermore permits no renunciation of the former. The 
Secretary-General of SEATO stated that where the Communist 
Party is legally forbidden, it has been able to f'unction 
14Barnett, ,,2,,£• £.!:!:,., P• 190. 
through various Chinese front organizations, secret socie• 
ties, and even Chambers of Commerce. 15 The governments of 
southeast Asia openly challenged this dual policy during 
the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955, and 
while the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En~lai expressed 
willingness to compromise this issue with Indonesia at 
that time, no comparable arrangement has been made with any 
ot the other Southeast Asian states. In fact, even in 
Indonesia the Chinese have been very reluctant to accept 
the change,and as a double insurance have elected to have 
one member of a family assume Indonesian citizenship while 
another would maintain his Chinese nationality.16 Many 
regarded this as an implied possibility among the overseas 
Chinese of some form of future take-over by the Communists. 
To most of these Chinese blood bas always proved thicker 
than economics, geography, or ideology. The writer was 
constantly reminded of this fact during his residence in 
Thailand, and especially after the Communist victory in 
China in 1949. 
Here, then, exists a situation similar to that found 
in prewar Europe where German communities outside the Reich 
1
.5oepartment of State, Bulletin, "Report on SEA.TO," 
Vol. XL, No. 1035 (Washington: u. s. Government Printing 
Office, April, 1959), P• 607. 
16 Barnett, .Q.E.• ~., P• 325. 
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(as in Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland) were clearly organized 
and manipulated to the Nazi's advantage in undermining the 
integrity of these smaller border states.17 But where 
Germany had to face the sturdy nationalism of the non-German 
elements in these countries, China can depend on the support 
of most of the non-Chinese who have espoused the inter-
national concept of world Communism and whose loyalties 
are doctrinal rather than national. Here China would appear 
to control two "fifth" columns, one ethnic and the other 
ideological. In the countries of Southeast Asia, these 
elements could be emploJ.ed in varying degrees, depending 
upon the overseas Chinese content of the area. In Malaya, 
for example, with a large Chinese minority but small 
Communist element, the ethnic control would be emphasized, 
while in Indonesia with a relatively small Chinese community, 
ideological ties would predominate. 
China has used these minorities within the Treaty 
area and has supported or participated with these Communist 
groups effectively in a long series of uprisings and in-
surgencies since the end of World War II. A list of these 
would include the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, the 
Malaya Insurgency, the Communist uprisings,in Burma among 
the Karen and Kachin tribes, the coup d'etat attempted by 
17charl~s A.. Fisher, "The Chinese Threat to Southeast 
Asia," ~Central Asian Journal, LI, 3 & 4, London 
(July, 1964), 262 • . 
! 
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Pridi Panamyong in Thailand, the military conquest of Tibet, 
the Kerala autonomous movement in India, the Korean War, 
the Viet-cong insurgency in South Vietnam, and the invasion 
of India in 1962. 
The overt Chinese aggression against a neighbor as in 
Tibet in 1951 could be likened to Germany's annexation of 
territories on he.r borders in the 1930 1 s which resulted in 
an intimidation and sense of defeatism among the small 
states following these adventures. Likewise the military 
ineffectiveness of India against open Chinese attack and 
invasion in 1962 has tended to produce similar reactions 
in Southeast Asia, with significant shifts in policy within 
Cambodia a.n.d Burma and the accelerated crumbling of re-
sistance in Laos and South Vietnam. Aside from the latent 
and implied deterrent effect of American nuclear capacity, 
no effective check on Chinese Communist expansion, other 
than: world opinion, existed until the organization of the 
Manila Treaty powers. 18 
The reason for fearing Chinese interest in this area 
is that Southeast Asia is one of the richest of all the 
world's tropical regions and as such has attracted invaders, 
both military and economic, continuously during the last 1000 
years. The lure of this tropical abundance set off the whole 
18Ibid., p. 260. 
-
process of worldwide co1onialism in this area. Although the 
earliest activities were confined merely to gaining control 
over these resources, more advanced forms of colonialism 
required guarantees of political stability and security to 
protect investments. The departure of European control and 
the totalitarian organization of' the Japanese occupation 
at the end of World War II left not only a power vacuum but 
an administrative one as well. This was reflected in the 
long postwar disorganization of the economies of the small 
states of Asia. During the war India saw itself as a 
potential substitute for both Japanese and European influ-
ence in this area. Thus writing in 1943, K. M. Panikkar 
stated that in most respects, 
the economy of India and Southeast Asia can be 
considered as being complementary. Therefore, 
if a satisfactory economy is to develop in this 
area after the war, it can only be if India and 
Southeast Asia work out a •co-Prosperity Sphere' 
based on their inter~dependence.19 
With Japan, India then was the third great over-
populated state to eye the abundance of Southeast Asia as 
a solution to its food and raw material problems. India 
aimed at a good neighbor policy toward Asia, based on 
mutual trust, self help, and the other tenets of Panche 
Sila, and for a period it appeared that this relationship 
was indeed beginning to grow. The Columbo Plan itself 
19 . Fisher, .Q.E.• £1!., p. 262. 
embodied these hopes and it is very likely for this reason 
that India took a strong position against Columbo Plan 
participation in SEA.TO, regarding it as a splintering 
influence of her own p.restige in the region. But India's 
failure to complete her own ambitious plans for indus-
trialization and her inability to meet Japanese competition 
in the area by 1960, reduced her claim as a serious leader 
in the economic organization of Asia~ 
The pressing need for food and raw materials has been 
a strong incentive for China to organize its own co-pros-
20 perity sphere. Geographical factors seriously restrict 
her ability to increase the necessary agricultural pro-
duction for minimal needs, but this nation does not lack 
the manpower to obtain these needs by force if necessary. 
Thus, the ambitions of Communist China in Southeast Asia 
can be easily understood, and likewise the fears of the 
people in this region for such ambitions. 
The value of SEA.TO is best measured by its implied 
function as a psychological deterrent to massive attack and 
Connnunist subversion. However, the military and technical 
capabilities of the Treaty powers, organized and directed 
by SEA.TO, ultimately determine the effectiveness of this 
deterrent. Admittedly, it is difficult to assess the full 
20~. · 
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value of this defense organization and its presence in 
southeast Asia. It is also impossible to state that SEATO 
has prevented a more aggressive Communist policy in Asia 
in the last decade. But, since the Manila Treaty came into 
effect in 1954, there has been no major assault or open 
attack against any of the Treaty powers similar to that 
witnessed in India in 1962. SEATO may well have been a 
deterrent. The settlement of the Laotian problem has not 
called for formal intervention of SEA.TO. Nor has there 
been a fo.rmal declaration by South Vietnam to seek Treaty 
protection as a designated state during the present Viet-
cong insurgency. But, individual members of the organization 
have not been prevented from taking independent action in 
support of the South Vietnam government. SEA.TO withstood 
much maligning because of its inaction during the Laotian 
crises. The lack of unanimity and cohesion on the political 
level during this crisis in 1961 and 1962, led many to 
believe that the alliance had lost its meaning. Even today 
SEA.TO's caution in the South Vietnam crisis has aroused 
criticism and even some joshing on the part of the Communist 
leadership. But by refusing to act precipitately, it may 
have avoided springing a Communist trap. By keeping the 
military strength of the alliance in the baekground during 
the crucial political developments in Laos, the Treaty powers 
were able to gain time to bolster the faltering Laotian 
I 
I 
I 
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government by political means. In many Asian eyes, this 
raised the stature of the organization, especially among 
those who feared that hasty and precipitous military 
judgement might prevail and plunge all Asia in war.21 
Mao-Tse•tung has compared SEA.TO 'to a faulty wall 
which will crumble under its own weight. Even so, 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk has pointed out that frequent 
Chinese propaganda attacks and demonstrations against the 
organization would suggest a high regard and concern for this 
so-called "paper tiger. 1122 Former Ambassador to South 
Vietnam, Frederick Reinhardt believes that such hostility 
to the Treaty implies that SEATO's presence has interrupted 
. 23 Communist designs on this region. Consequently, until 
the fear of Communist aggression is removed, these Treaty 
nations of Southeast Asia seem inclined to support Western 
participation in their collective defense and regard the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as the better alternative 
to a possible forced accommodation with Peking. 
21Norman J. Padelford, "SEATO and Peace in Southeast 
Asia,'' Current History (February, 1960), 38:95 • 
. 
22nean Rusk, "Seventh Annivers~y of SEATO," 
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1161, p. 528. 
23G. Frederick R~in~dt, "What SEATO Means to the 
United States," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XL, 
No. 1030, P• 397. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A 
THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY* 
The Parties to this Treaty, 
Recognising the sovereign equality of all the 
Parties, 
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and princi~ 
ples set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and 
their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all 
governments, 
Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal 
rights and selfedetermination of peoples, and declaring 
that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to 
promote self egovernment and to secure the independence of 
all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to 
undertake its responsibilities, 
Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and 
freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, indivi-
dual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the 
economic wellebeing and development of all peoples in the 
Treaty area, 
Intending to declare publicly and formally their 
sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will 
appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, 
and 
Desiring further to co...ordinate their efforts for 
collective defense for the preservation of peace and 
security, 
'Illerefore agree as follows: ~ 
ARTICLE I 
'lbe Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter 
of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes 
in which they may be 1nvolved by peaceful means in such 
manner that international peace and security and justice 
are not endangered, and to refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
*Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXI, No. 795, 
September 20, 1954. 
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ARTICLE II 
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives 
of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by 
means of continuous and effective self ~help and mutual aid 
will maintain and develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter 
subversive activities directed from without against their 
territorial integrity and political stability. 
ARTICLE III 
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free 
institutions and to co...operate with one another in the 
further development of economic measures, including 
technical assistance, designed both to promote economic 
progress and social well-being and to further the indivi~ 
dual and collective efforts of Governments toward these 
ends. 
ARTICLE IV 
l. Each Party recognises that aggression by means 
of anned attack in the treaty area against any of the 
Parties or against any state or territory which the Parties 
by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would 
endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will 
in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance 
with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under 
this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council of the United Nations. 
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the 
inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the 
sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the 
treaty area or of any other State or territory to which 
the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time 
to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed 
attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situa-
tion which might endanger the peace of the area, the 
Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the 
measures which should be taken except at the invitation or 
with the consent of the Government concerued. 
3. It is understood that no action on the territory 
of any State designated by unanimous agreement under para-
graph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated 
shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent 
of the Government concerned. 
I: 
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ARTICLE V 
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which 
each of them shall be represented, to consider matters 
concerning the implementation of this Treaty. '1he Council 
shall provide for consultation with regard to military and 
any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty 
area may from time to time require. '!he Council shall be 
so organised as to be able to meet at any time. 
ARTICLE VI 
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be 
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obliga~ 
tions of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Each Party declares that none of the international 
engagements now in force between it and any other of the 
Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions 
of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any inter-
national engagement in conflict with this Treaty. 
ARTICLE VII 
Any other State in a position to further the 
objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security 
of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be 
invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited 
may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instru-
ment of accession with the Goverrunent of the Republic of 
the Philippines. '!he Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit 
of each such instrument of accession. 
ARTICLE VIII 
As used in this Treaty, the 'treaty area' is the 
general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire 
territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of 
the South-West Pacific not including the Pacific area north 
of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, 
by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include 
within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding 
to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise 
to change the treaty area. 
I 
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ARTICLE IX 
1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives 
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly 
certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by the 
Government to the other signatories. 
2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions 
carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respec .... 
tive constitutional processes. The instruments of 
ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with 
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines which 
shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit. 
· 3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the 
States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments 
of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall 
have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect 
to each other State on the date of the deposit of its 
instrument of ratification. 
ARTICLE X 
'lb.is Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but 
any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice 
of denunciation has been given to the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the 
Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each 
notice of denunciation. 
ARTICLE XI 
The English text of this Treaty is binding on the 
Parties, but when the parties have agreed to the French 
text thereof and have so notified the Goverrunent of the 
Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be 
equally authentic and binding on the Parties. 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The United States of America in executing the 
present Treaty does so with the understanding that its 
recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack 
and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, 
paragraph 1, apply only to Communi~t aggression, but . a~firms 
that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it 
will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2. 
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries 
have signed this Treaty. 
Done at l'1anila, this eighth day of September, 1954. 
(Signatures) 
PRO'roCOL 
DESIGNATION OF THE STATES AND TERRI TORY AS TO 
WHICH PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IV AND 
ARTICLE III .ARE 'ro BE APPLICABLE . 
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The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty unanimously designate for the purpose of Article IV 
of the Treaty and the States of Cambodia and Laos and the 
free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Viet" 
Nam. 
The Parties further agree that the above mentioned 
states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the 
economic measures contemplated by Article III. 
This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously 
with the coming into force of the Treaty. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries 
have signed . this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Treaty. 
PACIFIC CHARTER 
II 
11 
I 
11 
I 
I 
The Delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand, I 
PThaak~1stand, theh.e URe~ubldiKic.ofdthe Pfhilippine~, ~he Kid·ngdom1of , i an , t m.te ng om o Great Britain an Nort ern 
Ireland, and the United States of America, 
Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action 
to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia and the 
Southwest Pacific, 
Convinced that common action to this end, in order 
to be worthy and effective, must by inspired by the highest I 
principles of justice and liberty, ,I 
Do Hereby Proclaim: 
First, in accordance with the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter 1 they uphold the principle of equal 
rights and self~determination of peoples and they will I 
earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self- i 1' 
government and to secure the independence of all countries 
1 
whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its 
responsibilities; 
Second, they are each prepared to continue taking 
effective practical measures to ensure conditions favorable 
to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in 
accordance with their constitutional processes; 
Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, 
social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living 
standards, economic progress and social well-being in this I 
region; 
11 
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Fourth, as declared in the Southeast Asia C.Ollective 
Defense Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter 
by appropriate means any attempt in the treaty area to 
subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or 
territorial integrity. 
Proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September, 
1954. 
I 
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APPENDIX B 
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES* 
The Parties to this Treaty, 
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their 
desire to live in peace with all peoples and all govern-
ments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in 
the Pacific Area, 
Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship 
which brought their two peoples together in a common bond 
of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side ... by-side again.st 
imperialist aggression during the last war, 
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense 
of unity and their common determination to defend themselves 
against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor 
could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone 
in the Pacific Area, 
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts 
for collective defense for the preservation of peace and 
security pending the development of a more comprehensive 
system of regional security in the Pacific Area, 
Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument 
shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense 
altering or diminishing any existing agreements or under~ 
standings between the United States of .America and the 
Republic of the Philippines, 
Have agreed as follows:-
ARTICLE I 
'lbe Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter 
of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes 
in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security and justice 
are not endangered and to refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
*U. s. Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Treat{ Provisions Relati2' to Use of u. s. Forces for 
Mutua Defense, October 2 , L9~ p. 22. - -
I 
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ARTICLE II 
In order more effectively to achieve the objective 
of this . Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by 
self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. 
ARTICLE III 
Tile Parties through their Foreign ~ti.nisters or 
their deputies 1 will consult together from time to time 
regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever 
in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, 
political independence or security of either of the Parties 
is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific. 
ARTICLE IV 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the 
Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous 
to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act 
to meet the common dangers in accordance with its consti-
tutional processes. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a 
result thereof shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council of the United Nations. Su.ch measures 
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to restore and maintain international 
peace and security. 
ARTICLE V 
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on 
either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack 
on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or 
on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the 
Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or air-
craft in the Pacific. 
ARTICLE VI 
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be 
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and 
obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the 
United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations 
for the maintenance of international peace_ and security. 
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ARTICLE VII 
- . 
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States 
of .America and the Repµblic of the Philippines in accord~ 
ance with their respective constitutional processes and 
will come into force when instruments of ratification 
thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. 
Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has 
been given to the other Party. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipoten-
tiaries have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth 
day of August 1951. 
(Here follow the signatures) 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, 
AND THE UNITED STATES OF . AMERICA 
('ANZUS' . TREATY)* 
'Ille Parties to this Treaty, 
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their 
desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Govern~ 
ments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace 
in the Pacific Area, 
Noting that the United States already has 
arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are 
stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and 
administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon 
the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may 
also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist 
in the preservation of peace and security int he Japan 
Area, 
Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have mili" 
tary obligations outside as well as within the Pacific 
Area, 
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their 
sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor oould be 
under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the 
Pacific Area! and 
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for 
collective defense for the preservation of peace and 
security pending the development of a more comprehensive 
system of regional security in the Pacific Area, 
Tilerefore declare and agree as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter 
of the United Nations, to settle any intern~tional dis~ 
putes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security and 
justice are not endangered and to refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force in any 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
*U. S. Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Treatt Provisions Relatin; to ~6e of u. s. Forces for 
Mutua Defense, October 2 , L9 · , p. !:53:- -
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ARTICEE II 
In order more effectively to achieve the objective 
of this . Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by 
means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual 
aid will maintain and develop their individual and col~ 
lective capacity to resist armed attack. 
ARTICLE III 
" . " 
The Parties will consult together whenever in the 
opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, politi-
cal independence or security of any of the Parties is 
threatened in the Pacific. 
ARTICLE IV 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the 
Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to 
its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to 
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a 
result thereof shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures 
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken 
the measures necessary to restore and maintain inter-
national peace and security. 
ARTICLE V 
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on 
any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack 
on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or" 
on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the 
Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft 
in the Pacific. 
ARTICLE VI 
'Ihis Treaty does not affect and shall not be 
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and 
obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the 
United Nations or the responsibility of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. 
I 
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ARTICLE VII 
The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting 
of their Foreign ¥dnisters of their Deputies, to consider 
matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The 
Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at 
any time. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Pending the development of a more comprehensive 
system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the 
development by the United Nations of more effective means 
to maintain international peace and security, t'ffi Council, 
established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a 
consultative relationship .with States, Regional Organiza~ 
tions, Associations of States or other authorities in th~ 
Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this 
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Area. 
ARTICLE IX 
nrls Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as 
soon as possible with the Govermnent of Australia, which 
will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. 
'!he Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifica~ 
tions of the signatories have been deposited. 
ARTICLE X 
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. 
Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council estab~ 
lished by Article VII one year after notice has been 
given to the Govermnent of Australia, which will inform 
the Governments of th.e other Parties of the deposit of 
such notice. 
ARTICLE XI 
This Treaty in the English language shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. 
165 
Duly cert~fied copies thereof will be transmitted by that 
Government to the Governments of each ,of the other 
signatories. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries 
have signed this Treaty. 
Done at the City of San Francisco this first day of 
September, 1951. 
(Signatures) 
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